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SUMMARY
In spite of the remarkable development of modern medical treatment and tech-
nology, the threat of pandemic diseases such as anthrax, cholera, and SARS has not
disappeared. As a part of emerging healthcare decision problems, many researchers
have studied how to detect and contain disease outbreaks, and our research is aligned
with this trend. This thesis mainly consists of two parts: epidemic simulation mod-
eling for effective intervention strategies and spatiotemporal monitoring for outbreak
detection.
We developed a stochastic epidemic simulation model of a pandemic influenza
virus (H1N1) to test possible interventions within a structured population. The pos-
sible interventions — such as vaccination, antiviral treatment, household prophylaxis,
school closure and social distancing — are investigated in a large number of scenarios,
including delays in vaccine delivery and low and moderate efficacy of the vaccine.
Since timely and accurate detection of a disease outbreak is crucial in terms of
preparation for emergencies in healthcare and biosurveillance, we suggest two spa-
tiotemporal monitoring charts, namely, the SMCUSUM and RMCUSUM charts, to
detect increases in the rate or count of disease incidents. Our research includes
convenient methods to approximate the control limits of the charts. An analytical
control limit approximation method for the SMCUSUM chart performs well under
certain conditions on the data distribution and monitoring range. Another control
limit approximation method for the RMCUSUM chart provides robust performance
to various monitoring range, spatial correlation structures, and data distributions




With the ongoing threat of pandemic diseases and bioterrorism, extensive research
efforts have been undertaken on the design and performance of disease outbreak
surveillance systems and mitigation strategies. Various models, originating from dif-
ferent research fields, have been proposed for analyzing and estimating the spread of
past and future pandemics.
Epidemic simulation models that mimic events happening in the real world with-
out making strong assumptions provide useful tools to increase our understanding of
the dynamics and patterns of disease propagation. They also allow for the study and
evaluation of the potential impacts of various government policies and intervention
strategies for infectious diseases, including vaccination, prophylactic use of antivirals,
and social distancing strategies such as school closure, quarantine, and isolation.
Over the last several years, these simulation models have been influential in the
formation of pandemic preparedness plans. A simulation can explore not only the
epidemiological impact but also the economic effectiveness of additional, reactive
strategies for containing disease outbreaks. Some of the challenges pertaining to such
simulation models can be summarized as follows.
• A simulation model must imitate the complicated real world. The population
and community structure designed for the simulation should be able to capture
the characteristics of a targeted population and the population’s behaviors. For
example, places of exposure, such as households, schools, and workplaces, should
be carefully selected by observing the population and the community structures
closely. To this end, a great deal of demographic input data are often required.
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• The model logic and interventions depend on the builder’s purpose, social situ-
ations encountered, and disease characteristics. The builder needs to determine
what kinds of interventions can be employed and how to apply them in the
model. For example, the availability and amount of vaccines/antivirals can be
affected by the wealth of the country and the disease dynamics. The distri-
bution of the vaccines/antivirals can be affected by political or geographical
supply chain issues. One must also study the exposure frequencies and times of
individuals, such as contact rates and contact durations, as well as the disease
transmission parameters such as the probability that an infected person will
infect a healthy person given their contacts. For these tasks, knowledge ranging
from sociology to epidemiology may be required.
• The model is carefully calibrated to predict illness attack rates to calculate costs
resulting from applied interventions. This is where the validity of the simulation
matters. It is difficult to track a relationship between illness attack rates and
costs. In addition, both direct and indirect costs should be considered. One
may find it difficult to obtain appropriate references for these costs.
A goal in this thesis is to develop a reasonable epidemic simulation model that
can test possible interventions for a structured community. The model should be able
to report valid estimates of illness attack rates and costs associated with the different
combinations of mitigation strategies. This type of model will be quite helpful for
public health authorities when reacting to future outbreaks of pandemics.
The timely and accurate detection of a disease outbreak is crucial for preparation
for emergency situations. Before any studied mitigation strategies are performed, one
must alarm (signal) an outbreak at an appropriate time, and decide when and where
to apply the mitigation strategies.
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One of the statistical approaches developed for timely outbreak detection is sta-
tistical process control (SPC) charts. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) charts have been
especially popular in public health surveillance to detect increases in the rate or
counts of disease incidents. However, the use of CUSUM charts in biosurveillance can
be challenging when compared to the conventional SPC charts in other application
areas. Possible challenges and opportunities include the following issues.
• Since the disease outbreak is a spatiotemporal event, the surveillance method
should detect the time when an outbreak occurs as well as the coverage of the
outbreak. Fast and accurate detection is important and preferred. Also, the
performance of the method should be evaluated with respect to detection time
and accuracy.
• Correlation may exist in observed data. This could be in the form of spatial
correlation, autocorrelation (over time), or both. A detection method that can
take advantage of the correlation, or at least can be applied to the correlated
data, is needed.
• The complexity in designing CUSUM charts often relates to the dimensionality
of monitoring regions. The control limits of the CUSUM charts are typically
calibrated by trial-and-error simulation, but this task can be extremely time-
consuming and challenging if the number of monitoring regions is large.
• Surveillance through the CUSUM charts requires intensive modeling of the mon-
itoring system that changes according to the input parameters and the under-
lying data distribution (which is often unknown).
In this thesis, we focus on spatiotemporal multivariate CUSUM (MCUSUM)
charts to detect a disease outbreak. In order to avoid tedious simulations to cali-
brate the MCUSUM charts, we first propose MCUSUM charts whose control limits
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are approximated analytically by assuming the charts are independent; and then we
will expand our research to make the charts applicable to any data distribution, even
in the presence of the correlation among the charts.
Chapter 2 introduces a stochastic model to investigate realistic strategies that
can be used in reaction to emerging outbreaks of pandemic influenza. The model
is constructed to represent a typical mid-sized North American city, and calibrated
to documented illness attack rates. Reduced attack rates and economic costs due
to the intervention strategies are estimated. Chapter 3 reviews MCUSUM charts
based on sequential likelihood ratio tests in the presence of spatial correlations, and
then proposes an analytical method that approximates the control limits, making the
design of the MCUSUM charts much more convenient. We also study how spatial
correlation impacts the scheme’s outbreak detection performance. Chapter 4 studies
another class of MCUSUM chart that can be robust to any underlying distribution of
data in the presence of spatial correlation. The chart provides reliable performance
by overcoming certain restrictions of the MCUSUM charts developed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 summarizes the main contributions of the thesis.
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Chapter II
REACTIVE STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING
OUTBREAKS OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
In April, 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the emergence of
a new influenza A (H1N1) virus, and on June 11, 2009, it declared that the world
was at the start of a new influenza pandemic [68]. WHO reported more than 414,000
laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 [67] — a gross underestimate, as many countries
simply stopped counting individual cases. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention reported widespread influenza activity in forty-six states, with influenza-
like illness (ILI) activity in October 2009 higher than what is seen during the peak of
many regular flu seasons; and further, “Almost all of the influenza viruses identified
. . . are 2009 H1N1 influenza A viruses” [7]. Countries found themselves in the position
of having to react to contain already developing Fall outbreaks of influenza due to
the new pandemic strain, a position they are likely to find themselves in again if and
when future waves of pandemic influenza occur.
Research has suggested that mass vaccination of 60–70% of the population prior
to the start of the flu season could effectively contain outbreaks due to pandemic
strains [12, 17, 29, 69]; and the public health preparedness plans of most countries
have, accordingly, emphasized vaccination intervention strategies. However, the re-
cent experience with H1N1 suggests that high vaccination coverage levels are difficult
to achieve. In the case of H1N1, vaccination programs in most northern hemisphere
countries started only after the virus was widely circulating. Furthermore, in some
countries, supplies of vaccine were limited [9], delivery and administration occurred
over a period of several months [37, 42], and there were reports of public skepticism
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regarding the necessity and safety of vaccination [36, 38], all of which were strong
indicators suggesting that high vaccination coverage would be difficult to achieve.
While many institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere strongly encouraged and, in some
cases, required workers to be vaccinated against seasonal influenza in 2009, H1N1 vac-
cination guidelines were focused mostly on people in certain age and high-risk groups
[8]. Delays, limited and untimely vaccination supplies, and public reluctance to be
vaccinated are likely to reduce the effectiveness of vaccination campaigns [17, 69].
The issues outlined above for the recent outbreak of H1N1 are likely to occur
again in future outbreaks of pandemic influenza. In this chapter, we explore the
effectiveness of realistic reactive intervention strategies implemented after the begin-
ning of outbreaks of pandemic influenza. We calibrate our model based on data for
the H1N1 pandemic (see Tuite et al. [63]), and we investigate the impacts of (i) the
moderate vaccination coverage levels which, based on past experience, are likely to be
realized, as well as high levels which would be more ideal; (ii) very limited treatment
of cases with antivirals and prophylaxis of cases’ households with antivirals; and (iii)
limited and practical social distancing measures such as five-day closure of individual
schools on an as-needed basis, encouragement of liberal leave policies in the work-
place, and encouragement of self-isolation. Intervention strategies that combine these
approaches are also studied (cf. Halloran et al. [18]). For all intervention strategies,
we provide cost estimates associated with morbidity and mortality that take into
account direct medical costs as well as economic consequences resulting from school
closures and work loss. The research conducted in this chapter has been published in
Andradóttir et al. [2].
2.1. Simulation Model
We developed a portable and adaptable stochastic, individual-level simulation model
of influenza spread within a structured population. The simulator is similar to models
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developed by Longini et al. [29, 30]. A simulated population of 649,565 people was
generated stochastically to represent a typical North American city, namely, Hamil-
ton (Ontario), Canada, which was chosen due to availability of demographic and
epidemiological data necessary for constructing and calibrating the simulator. Our
population is a collection of heterogeneous individuals with various attributes that
impact whom they interact with (and hence whom they may infect or get infected
by). More specifically, each individual has the following stochastically generated at-
tributes: age, household, playgroup or daycare attended (for pre-school children),
school attended (for school-age children), workgroup (for working adults), household
census tract and workplace census subdivision, community, and neighborhood. As in
Longini et al. [30], a community consists of approximately 2000 people living within
the same census tract, and a neighborhood consists of approximately 500 people living
within proximity to each other within the same community; also see the recent papers
including Aleman et al. [1] and Stroud et al. [57], which incorporate more-detailed
individual-level behavior involving larger populations. Age and household-size dis-
tributions, shown in Figures 1 and 2, were matched to 2001 Canadian census data
[54, 55]. Household census tract assignments were made so that census tract popula-
tion sizes were consistent with 2006 census statistics [51].
Each individual belongs to three or four contact groups. In particular, each indi-
vidual belongs to a household, neighborhood, and community. In addition, children
younger than 16 belong to either a playgroup, daycare, or school, depending on age;
most children in age range 16–18 belong to a school or workgroup; and most adults
in age range 19–59 belong to a workgroup. Preschool children were categorized as be-
longing to a playgroup/daycare, each with 50% probability. We separated secondary
schools into middle schools and high schools based on grade to allow different con-
tact group sizes and to make our model more representative of mid-sized U.S. cities.
The numbers of playgroups, daycares, elementary, middle, and high schools in each
7
Figure 1: Age distribution for simulated population
Figure 2: Household size distribution for simulated population
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community were based on Longini et al. [30], and were combined with the number of
individuals in each category in our simulation population to obtain the contact group
sizes.
Workgroups were formed to match 2006 employment statistics [53] as well as
census statistics on the geographical distribution of workers [52]. The number of
working adults (19–59 years old) was based on census data [52]; and the number of
working children (16–18 years old) was based on Ontario data on drop-out rates [5] and
the employment rate for ages 15–24 [52]. Rather than representing entire workplace
institutions, we formed workgroups of size 20 to represent the typical number of co-
workers an individual is likely to have close contact with during the day. Average
playgroup, daycare, and lower and upper secondary school (i.e., middle and high
school) contact group sizes were chosen following similar reasoning.
2.1.1 Disease Transmission Model
The simulator models influenza transmission over a 180-day period, within the contact
groups previously defined. To initiate influenza outbreaks, simulations are seeded
with approximately 100 randomly selected initial infectives, with all other individuals
considered susceptible (state 0). Susceptible people are assumed to have daily contacts
with other individuals in their contact groups, i.e., their household and school or
workgroups, as well as with people in their neighborhood and community. Susceptible
people have the opportunity, each day, to become infected in their contact groups.
The daily probability of infection for each susceptible person is determined by the
number of infectious contacts in his contact groups, and on the per-contact probability
of transmission for each type of contact. For example, the probability of a susceptible
child who attends daycare being infected on a particular day is:
1 −
[
Pr(child is not infected in the household)
× Pr(child is not infected in the neighborhood)
9
× Pr(child is not infected in the community)
× Pr(child is not infected at the daycare center)
]
.
Within each contact group, the probability of infection of a susceptible individual
depends on the number of infectious individuals in the group. For example, suppose
that k1 children and k2 adults in a household are infectious on a particular day. Then
the probability of a susceptible household member being infected in that household
on that day is:
1 −
[
Pr(not infected by a child in the household)k1
× Pr(not infected by an adult in the household)k2
]
.
The number of infectious people in the contact groups (e.g., k1 and k2), are random
variables that are updated at the beginning of each day.
Infection of susceptibles depends on the number of infected persons in their con-
tact groups, on the vaccine and antiviral-use status of susceptibles and their infectious
contacts, and on age- and contact-group-specific per-contact transmission probabili-
ties (Table 1). The probability that infection is transmitted from an infected person
to a susceptible person also depends on whether the infectious person is symptomatic
or asymptomatic. Table 1 shows the rates for symptomatic individuals. The trans-
mission rates for asymptomatic individuals are half of those shown in Table 1. These
probabilities are based on Longini et al. [29, 30], with adjustments made to calibrate
baseline (no intervention) results.
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Table 1: Per-contact influenza transmission probabilities within contact groups









Adult (ages 19–52) 0.000075









1 Within households, the probability that a symptomatic child
(age 18 years or less) infects a susceptible child is 0.8; that a
symptomatic child infects a susceptible adult (at least 19 years
old), or that a symptomatic adult infects a susceptible child,
is 0.3; that a symptomatic adult infects a susceptible adult is
0.4 [30].
2 Probability that a susceptible person in the age or school group
is infected through contact with a symptomatic person in the
group.
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Table 2: Age-group-specific illness attack rates and calibrated attack rates
Simulated illness attack rates by the




Age 30% 50% 70% Age AR
0–4 30.6% 31.0% 30.8% 0–4 29.5%
5–13 53.8% 55.0% 55.2% 5–18 55.9%
14–17 56.0% 57.1% 57.3%
18–22 48.9% 49.7% 49.7% 19–52 40.8%
23–52 39.6% 39.8% 39.3%
53–64 21.7% 15.3% 8.8% 53–59 14.3%
65+ 19.1% 13.2% 7.5% 60+ 11.0%
Overall 36.8% 35.4% 33.5% Overall 34.1%
1 See the discussion in Tuite et al. [62].
The simulator is calibrated to match documented illness attack rates and basic
reproduction numbers (R0), defined as the number of cases one case generates on
average over the course of its infectious period. Baseline (no-intervention) scenario
age-group-specific attack rates were derived using 2009 estimates for the H1N1 basic
reproduction number in Ontario [20, 62, 63] (see Table 2). These rates take into
account reduced risk in adults born prior to 1957 [20]. A compartmental model
parameterized in this way was well-calibrated to observed attack rates during the
Fall pandemic wave in Ontario [62]. The simulator’s R0 value of 1.4 is also consistent
with other published reports such as Fraser et al. [13], New Scientist [35] and Yang
et al. [69].
Figure 3 depicts a flowchart of the model. The modeled natural history and
simulator dynamics parameters, described below and shown in Figure 3, were based
on Longini et al. [29, 55]. People infected with influenza first pass through a 1–
3 day latent / incubation period (state 1; average length 1.9 days), during which
they do not have influenza symptoms. They are not infectious until the last day of
the period; at that point, they become half as infectious as if they were to develop
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Figure 3: Simulation flowchart and modeled influenza natural history
symptoms in the subsequent period. During that subsequent infectious period, 67%
will develop influenza symptoms (state 2), and 33% will be asymptomatic (state 3).
Symptomatic infectives are assumed to be twice as infectious as asymptomatics, and
have a chance of withdrawing home during each day of illness; upon withdrawal,
they only make contacts within their household and neighborhood, with transmission
probabilities doubled in the household contact group, until they recover. If a school
child withdraws home due to illness, one adult in the household also stays home.
Each day in states 2 and 3, an infectious person has a chance to exit the state and
be removed from the simulation (i.e., to recover or die — state 4). Probabilities for




We modeled a baseline case where no intervention takes place, along with strategies
representing various combinations of vaccination, antiviral treatment and household
prophylaxis, school closure, and general social distancing (see the results in Tables 3
and 4 and Table 23 provided in the Appendix A). Each component of the strategies
is described in detail below. Interventions are triggered in a particular simulation run
when the overall illness attack rate reaches 0.01%. Twenty runs of the simulator were
performed for each intervention strategy, from which average illness attack rates were
calculated. We briefly describe the interventions under consideration.
Vaccination : We model both pre-vaccination as well as reactive strategies, with
reactive vaccination programs beginning immediately, 30 days, or 60 days after the
trigger. The delays model disruptions in vaccine production and supply chains. We
allow enough doses to cover either 35% or 70% of the population. In reactive strate-
gies, we consider cases where (i) all vaccines become available at the same time, and
(ii) the doses become available in three equal-sized batches, two weeks apart, due to
additional production and supply-chain disruptions. Vaccine efficacy refers to the re-
duction, after vaccination, in the probability of becoming infected due to contact with
an infected person (VEs), or to the reduction, after vaccination, in the probability
of infecting a susceptible contact (VEi). Vaccine efficacy does not refer to the frac-
tion of individuals having an immunogenic response to the vaccine (which is typically
much larger than our measures). We study a low-efficacy single-dose vaccine (efficacy
against susceptibility to infection, VEs = 0.3, and efficacy against infectiousness, VEi
= 0.2) as well as a moderate-efficacy vaccine (VEs = 0.4, VEi = 0.5) [3]. Each day,
our model randomly vaccinates any remaining unvaccinated individuals who are ei-
ther uninfected or in the latent or asymptomatic phases of infection, all with equal
probability based on the number of available doses. Moreover, protection from the
vaccine builds over time, with 50% of the vaccine’s efficacy realized upon vaccination,
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and full protection after two weeks.
Antiviral Treatment and Household Prophylaxis : We investigate strategies
involving treatment of infected individuals with a five-day course of antivirals, as
well as strategies that also allow for ten-day prophylaxis of the infected individuals’
household members. We assume that 1% of individuals do not complete their course.
We use an antiviral efficacy against susceptibility (AVEs) of 0.3 and against infec-
tiousness (AVEi) of 0.7 [30]. Individuals receive direct benefit from antivirals only
while they are taking them. Antiviral use is considered alone and in combination
with other intervention strategies. It is assumed that antiviral courses are available
for 10% of the population and that they are distributed to infected individuals and
their household members until the supply is exhausted.
School Closure and Social Distancing : We implement a rolling school closure
model, where a daycare or school closes for five days if five or more cases are identified
in that group. Given that infected individuals are on average infectious for 4.1 days
(see Figure 3), closing schools for fewer than 5 days is unlikely to be very effective. It
is possible for these groups to close more than once during the simulation. We also
model a reduction in workplace and general community contacts of 20% (i.e., 20%
of infected individuals in each contact group will not infect other members of the
group). This represents the exercise of a general level of caution, including a modest
limitation of contacts within workgroups (e.g., by invoking occasional telecommuting
and other self-limiting behaviors, holding fewer large meetings, etc.) and also within
the general community (e.g., reduction in attendance in social groups and larger
community events, etc.).
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Table 3: Attack rates and total costs of interventions with 35% vaccination coverage











VL Pre-vaccination 26.1 71.1
VL Reactive, no delay 28.8 77.7 28.8 77.7
VL 30-day delay 29.0 78.1 29.5 79.3
VL 60-day delay 30.7 82.2 32.2 86.0
VM Pre-vaccination 18.8 53.7
VM Reactive, no delay 22.6 62.8 22.8 63.1
VM 30-day delay 23.0 63.7 24.6 67.5
VM 60-day delay 27.3 74.1 30.8 82.5
VL+A Pre-vaccination 19.3 56.4
VL+A Reactive, no delay 25.2 70.6 25.3 70.8
VL+A 30-day delay 25.4 71.1 25.7 71.8
VL+A 60-day delay 26.2 72.9 27.1 75.0
VM+A Pre-vaccination 2.1 16.1
VM+A Reactive, no delay 8.1 30.1 10.0 34.3
VM+A 30-day delay 12.4 40.2 15.8 48.2
VM+A 60-day delay 18.6 54.7 20.8 60.1
VL+S Pre-vaccination 12.7 69.9
VL+S Reactive, no delay 17.3 93.6 17.5 95.7
VL+S 30-day delay 17.8 96.5 18.3 99.0
VL+S 60-day delay 18.6 101.9 19.6 108.8
VM+S Pre-vaccination 2.3 19.6
VM+S Reactive, no delay 6.8 41.6 8.5 49.4
VM+S 30-day delay 9.9 56.3 15.4 87.3
VM+S 60-day delay 13.4 74.7 17.9 95.7
VL+A+S Pre-vaccination 1.0 15.9
VL+A+S Reactive, no delay 3.9 29.2 4.5 32.2
VL+A+S 30-day delay 4.6 32.6 4.9 34.2
VL+A+S 60-day delay 4.8 33.8 5.4 36.8
VM+A+S Pre-vaccination 0.2 11.9
VM+A+S Reactive, no delay 0.5 13.1 0.8 14.9
VM+A+S 30-day delay 1.2 16.6 1.6 18.6
VM+A+S 60-day delay 2.0 20.2 2.4 22.0
1 Abbreviations for modeled interventions: V (vaccination of up to 35% of the population), L (low
efficacy), M (moderate efficacy), A (antiviral treatment and household prophylaxis of up to 10% of
the population), S (school closure and social distancing).
2 Initial supply-chain delays which prevent immediate initiation of vaccination programs after the inter-
vention trigger occurs.
3 Additional supply-chain delays, after initiation of the vaccination program, as a result of which vaccines
become available in three equal batches, spaced two weeks apart.
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Table 4: Attack rates and total costs of interventions with 70% vaccination coverage






Attack rate (%) Cost (US$m) Attack rate (%) Cost (US$m)
VL Pre-vaccination 12.0 47.0
VL Reactive, no delay 22.2 71.1 22.4 71.6
VL 30-day delay 22.7 72.4 24.1 75.7
VL 60-day delay 27.1 83.0 30.4 89.4
VM Pre-vaccination 0.2 19.3
VM Reactive, no delay 2.2 25.6 4.6 29.7
VM 30-day delay 8.1 39.5 13.3 50.2
VM 60-day delay 22.6 74.0 27.6 83.0
VL+A Pre-vaccination 3.3 28.3
VL+A Reactive, no delay 17.3 61.1 17.7 62.0
VL+A 30-day delay 17.9 62.5 18.4 63.9
VL+A 60-day delay 19.9 67.4 22.0 72.4
VM+A Pre-vaccination 0.1 20.7
VM+A Reactive, no delay 0.6 22.0 1.2 23.3
VM+A 30-day delay 2.4 26.2 4.4 30.9
VM+A 60-day delay 6.6 36.1 12.2 49.1
VL+S Pre-vaccination 0.7 22.0
VL+S Reactive, no delay 5.9 46.0 7.5 53.1
VL+S 30-day delay 9.5 63.0 11.0 70.6
VL+S 60-day delay 13.3 82.6 15.4 96.6
VM+S Pre-vaccination 0.0 19.1
VM+S Reactive, no delay 0.2 19.7 0.7 22.0
VM+S 30-day delay 1.5 25.9 3.2 34.7
VM+S 60-day delay 6.4 51.2 9.8 69.1
VL+A+S Pre-vaccination 0.2 21.3
VL+A+S Reactive, no delay 1.8 28.4 2.6 32.0
VL+A+S 30-day delay 2.9 33.6 3.2 35.2
VL+A+S 60-day delay 3.8 37.8 4.6 41.7
VM+A+S Pre-vaccination 0.0 20.6
VM+A+S Reactive, no delay 0.1 20.1 0.2 21.6
VM+A+S 30-day delay 0.5 22.8 0.7 23.8
VM+A+S 60-day delay 1.2 26.1 1.4 27.4
1 Abbreviations for modeled interventions: V (vaccination of up to 70% of the population), L (low
efficacy), M (moderate efficacy), A (antiviral treatment and household prophylaxis of up to 10% of
the population), S (school closure and social distancing).
2 Initial supply-chain delays which prevent immediate initiation of vaccination programs after the inter-
vention trigger occurs.
3 Additional supply-chain delays, after initiation of the vaccination program, as a result of which vaccines
become available in three equal batches, spaced two weeks apart.
17
2.2. Economic Cost Estimation
We determine economic costs associated with the influenza outbreaks and modeled
intervention strategies. We include medical spending due to illness, costs of antivirals
and vaccines, and costs associated with teachers and other working adults staying
home due to their own illness, illness of dependent children, or due to school closure.
Medical spending includes co-payments and net payments for outpatient visits and
hospitalization, as well as prescription and over-the-counter medications for influenza
and complications or secondary infections. Costs are stratified by age-group and by
low- or high-risk status of individuals with respect to complications of influenza. We
also include the present value of earnings lost due to premature mortality.
Cost estimates and probabilities of risk status and of complications and death
were taken from Meltzer et al. [33], with costs inflated using 2008 consumer price
index and medical price index estimates [6, 23, 32, 58]. These costs are combined
with the data on age-specific attack rates, utilized vaccination doses, and days of
school closure obtained from our simulation model.
The total cost of each intervention scenario includes the cost of vaccine doses
and antiviral courses used, if any; costs associated with parents staying at home
with sick children and school teachers, parents, and children staying home due to
school closure; costs due to illness-related absence from work; medical costs associated
with illness, including outpatient visits, prescription and over-the-counter drugs, and
hospitalization; and lost earnings due to death.
We use methods described by Meltzer et al. [33] to quantify most medical and
work-loss costs (see also Medlock and Galvani [32]). Table 5 shows the proportions of
illnesses assumed to be at high risk for complications among children (0–18 years old),
younger adults (19–59 years old) and seniors (over 60). Table 6 shows estimated rates
of outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and death used in our calculations for children,
adults, and seniors at high risk and not at high risk of complications. We chose the
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Table 5: Proportions of influenza cases at high risk for complications1




1 Proportions taken from Meltzer et al. [33], and adapted to our age groups.
Table 6: Outpatient visit, hospitalization, and death rates1
Rates per 1000 persons ill
Outpatient visits Hospitalization Deaths
Not at high risk
Children 165 0.20 0.014
Adults 40 0.18 0.025
Seniors 45 1.50 0.280
High risk
Children 289 2.10 0.126
Adults 70 0.83 0.100
Seniors 79 4.00 2.760
1 Rates taken from Meltzer et al. [33]
‘low’ rate estimates presented in Meltzer et al. [33], which we believe to be most
consistent with the relatively low R0 (1.4) for our model.
Frequency and costs (in US$) associated with influenza-related outpatient visits,
hospitalizations, and deaths are shown in Table 7. All the above costs were combined
with age-specific attack rates obtained from our simulation model. In addition, we
assume average costs of $25 per vaccine dose or antiviral course used, consistent with
previous reports [48]. Table 8 shows other costs associated with vaccination (i.e.,
the cost of lost time, travel, and side effects). These costs are based on Bowlby [5],
inflated as described above. The vaccination costs are combined with the number of
used vaccination doses obtained from our simulation model. We assume that 1% of
antiviral users discontinue use due to side effects; medical and other costs associated
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with these side effects are not included in our model.
To estimate costs of ill individuals staying home and work-loss associated with
parents staying at home with sick children, we multiplied the number of days (ob-
tained from our simulation model) with the inflation-adjusted average value of lost
days from Table 7. Similarly, we estimated the average number of teachers at schools
and daycares by dividing the total number of such teachers in Hamilton [56] among
the schools and daycares in our model. To estimate the cost of lost teacher produc-
tivity due to school closures, we multiplied the number of days schools and daycares
are closed in our simulation model by the average number of teachers at Hamilton
schools and daycares and by the average value of a day of lost work obtained from
Table 7.
Table 23 in the Appendix A shows age-stratified and overall illness attack rates
for all modeled scenarios, along with total cost estimates. Figure 4 depicts the total
cost (US$m) plotted vs. average overall illness attack rate (%) for each intervention.
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Table 7: Outpatient visit, hospitalization, and death costs1
Age group
Outcome category item Children Adults Seniors
Outpatient Visits
Average no. visits per case 1.52 1.52 1.52
Net payment per visit $80.90 $62.74 $82.55
Average copayment for outpatient visit $8.26 $6.60 $6.60
Net payment per prescription $41.28 $59.44 $59.44
Average prescriptions per visit 0.9 1.8 1.4
Average copayment per prescription $4.95 $4.95 $4.95
Days lost 3 2 5
Value of 1 day lost $91.85 $141.30 $91.85
Subtotal: Per-case Outpatient Costs $448.86 $496.50 $679.47
Hospitalization
Hospital cost $4,847.34 $9,932.42 $11,319.26
Net payment per outpatient visit $122.17 $155.19 $168.40
Average copayment for outpatient visit $8.26 $6.60 $6.60
Net payment for drug claims $42.93 $69.34 $67.69
Most likely days lost 5 8 10
Value of 1 day lost $91.85 $141.30 $91.85
Subtotal: Per-case Hospitalization Costs $5,479.92 $11,293.96 $12,480.40
Deaths
Average age (years) 9 35 74
PV earnings lost $1,435,750 $1,466,231 $93,027
Most likely hospital costs $5,671 $12,555 $13,718
Subtotal $1,441,422 $1,478,788 $106,746
Ill but no medical care sought
Days lost 3 2 5
Value of 1 day lost $91.85 $141.30 $91.85
Over-the-counter drugs $3.30 $3.30 $3.30
Subtotal: Per-case ill (no care sought) $278.84 $285.90 $462.53
1 Estimates based on figures from Meltzer et al. [33]. Cost estimates inflated by 2008 consumer and
medical price indices [6, 23, 58] as appropriate.
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Assumed cost of vaccination $25.00
Patient time $5.65
Patient travel costs $5.65
Side effect
Mild 0.0325 $94 $5.04
Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) 0.000002 $100,800 $0.33
Anaphylaxis 0.000000157 $2,490 $0.0006
1 Estimates based on figures from Meltzer et al. [33]. Travel and side effect cost estimates inflated
by 2008 consumer and medical price indices [6, 23, 58] as appropriate.
2.3. Simulation Results
With no intervention, the average overall illness attack rate is 34.1%, with an esti-
mated total cost of $81.1 million (Table 3). Pre-vaccination of 35% of the population
with a low-efficacy vaccine reduces the average overall illness attack rate to 26.1%
(total cost $71.1 million), and with a moderate-efficacy vaccine to 18.8% (total cost
$53.7 million). Not surprisingly, pre-vaccination of 70% of the population is more
effective (overall average illness attack rate 12.0%, total cost $47.0 million for a low-
efficacy vaccine; and 0.2% and $19.3 million with a moderate-efficacy vaccine; see
Table 4).
Reactive vaccination alone, of 35% of the population with a low-efficacy vaccine
delivered in three batches, reduces the overall average illness attack rate to 28.8%
(or 22.8% with a moderate-efficacy vaccine), with a total cost of $77.7 million ($63.1
million with a moderate-efficacy vaccine). Thirty- and 60-day delays in initiation of
reactive vaccination, with vaccines delivered in three batches, result in attack rates
of 29.5% (total cost $79.3 million) and 32.2% (total cost $86.0 million), respectively,
for a low-efficacy vaccine, and 24.6% (total cost $67.5 million) and 30.8% (total cost
$82.5 million), respectively, for a moderate-efficacy vaccine. Figure 5 shows daily
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Figure 4: Total cost of intervention strategies vs. the average illness attack rate
attack rates for (i) the case of 70% coverage of low-efficacy vaccine with 60-day initial
delay, and (ii) the baseline case. For case (i), the vaccine is given on the 60th day
followed by receipt of vaccine after two additional two-week delays (see arrows in
Figure 5). Note that vaccine given on the 60th day decreases the attack rate compared
to the baseline; but the two subsequent receipts of vaccine do not result in additional
benefits. Clearly, with a 60-day delay, interventions occur too late in the epidemic to
have any meaningful effect (see Figure 5).
Antiviral use at low (10%) coverage alone results in an overall attack rate of
31.3% (total cost $75.9 million). School closure and social distancing alone result in
an attack rate of 24.0%, with a total cost of $125.0 million.
Suppose we combine reactive low-efficacy vaccination of 35% of the population
delivered in three batches, antivirals (10% coverage), and school closure and social
distancing. Then the overall average illness attack rate is 4.5% (total cost $32.2
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Figure 5: Daily attack rates
million) if no delays occur in the initiation of vaccination, and 5.4% (total cost $36.8
million) if a 60-day delay occurs. With a moderate-efficacy vaccine, the attack rate
for this last scenario reduces to 2.4% (total cost $22.0 million). Similar relationships
between interventions are apparent for interventions with 70% vaccination coverage,
shown in Table 4. Vaccination coverage of 70% with a moderate-efficacy vaccine,
combined with antiviral treatment and school closure, is highly effective, even with
an initial 60-day delay and additional supply-chain disruptions (average illness attack
rate 1.4%, total cost $27.4 million).
We note that the results when all vaccines are available at the same time are better
than those involving delivery in batches, and sometimes significantly so, especially
for a moderate-efficacy vaccine (Tables 3 and 4). Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the
comparative illness attack rates of the various intervention strategies discussed above
for all combinations of low/moderate-efficacy vaccine delivered in three batches and
at 35%/70% coverage as a function of the initial delay in vaccination implementation
due to supply-chain disruptions. The impact of vaccinating 70% of the population,
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rather than 35%, ranges from moderate to substantial, with the increased coverage
being most beneficial when the vaccine is delivered in a timely manner, and the
vaccine is either of moderate efficacy or of low efficacy applied in combination with
other intervention strategies.
Complete (age-stratified and overall) average illness attack results for all modeled
interventions are given in Table 23 in Appendix A. The comparative effectiveness of
interventions is similar when age-group-specific results are studied.
Figure 8A illustrates attack rate and total cost combinations for interventions that
result in at least a 75% reduction in cost compared to no intervention. Abbreviations
for modeled interventions are PV (pre-vaccination), V (vaccination), L (low-efficacy),
M (moderate efficacy), 35 (35% coverage of population), 70 (70% coverage), A (an-
tiviral treatment and household prophylaxis of up to 10% of the population), and S
(school closure and social distancing). Multiple occurrences of each plotting symbol
may occur; occurrences at higher costs and illness attack rates represent interven-
tions with longer supply-chain delays. In Figure 8A, the closer to the origin, the
more desirable an intervention is in terms of total cost and average illness attack
rate. Aside from pre-vaccination strategies, we see that 70% reactive vaccination
with a moderate-efficacy vaccine and school closure and social distancing, or even
35% reactive vaccination with a moderate-efficacy vaccine, antiviral use, and school
closure, also result in substantial reductions in cost and attack rates. Figure 8B illus-
trates attack rate and cost results for interventions that result in more-modest 50–75%
reductions in cost compared to no intervention. Once again, several strategies com-
bining vaccination, antiviral use, and school closure/social distancing are competitive
with pre-vaccination.
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Figure 6: Illness attack rates for modeled interventions with 35% vaccine coverage
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Figure 7: Illness attack rates for modeled interventions with 70% vaccine coverage
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Figure 8: Total cost of modeled intervention strategies vs. average illness attack rate
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2.4. Discussion
Previously published research has shown that pre-vaccination of 60–70% of the popu-
lation can contain seasonal as well as pandemic influenza, but that delays in vaccina-
tion can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the vaccination programs [5–8]. Our model
confirms these results for moderate-efficacy vaccines (Tables 3, 4, and 23). However,
vaccination efforts in countries such as the U.S., Canada, and others began well after
the first waves of H1N1 activity, and it is reasonable to believe that the same will
be true in future outbreaks of pandemic influenza. In particular, in the event of an
outbreak, it will likely take time to achieve high levels of vaccination coverage, and,
if past experience with seasonal influenza vaccination campaigns is an indication, it
is plausible that only low or moderate coverage will eventually be achieved. The
results of our simulation model show that delayed and low-coverage reactive vacci-
nation strategies (with a low-efficacy vaccine, plus limited use of antivirals) will not
be enough to mitigate the pandemic or to significantly reduce total costs associated
with influenza morbidity and mortality (based on results from Table 3, average ill-
ness attack rates are only reduced by 26% and total costs by 13%, compared to no
intervention).
According to our model, combining rolling, limited-duration, as-needed closures
of individual schools and a practical social distancing policy with 35% reactive low-
efficacy vaccination coverage and low-level (10%) antiviral use can reduce illness at-
tack rates by 89% compared to no intervention, as well as total costs by 64%. Sim-
ilarly, combining interventions in this manner reduces overall attack rates by 99%
and costs by 84% when a moderate-efficacy vaccine is available. This strategy re-
mains highly effective even when delays in implementing vaccination of up to 60
days occur. Previously published results have left open the question of how costly
interventions involving school closure might be [17]. Our results show that reactive
combination strategies that include practical school closure measures, when diligently
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implemented, can reduce total costs associated with influenza morbidity and mortal-
ity substantially.
Our model has several limitations. We do not consider vaccination strategies tar-
geted to high-risk groups, which could reduce costs associated with complications
from influenza. We have not modeled co-circulating strains of seasonal and pandemic
influenza or possible resistance to antiviral drugs (although, to mitigate this limita-
tion, our model assumes only low coverage with antivirals, as well as interventions
without antivirals). As is always the case with simulation models, continuing follow-
up analyses are needed, including: (i) sensitivity to model parameters; (ii) sensitivity
to model intervention triggers (e.g., overall illness attack rate, numbers of cases de-
tected in schools, etc.); (iii) sensitivity to R0, which can be heterogeneous across
cities and countries; and (iv) results for new H1N1 natural history and transmission
parameters, and new cost estimates for complications resulting from H1N1 illness, as
they become known.
Our model has several strengths. We model a large, realistic, heterogeneous pop-
ulation, base the simulation model on well-studied and documented stochastic simu-
lators, calibrate to actual H1N1 attack rates and most-likely R0 values, and have the
ability to model large numbers of scenarios in a relatively short amount of time on a
desktop platform. The model also provides cost estimates that are useful for making
policy decisions about potentially expensive interventions. In particular, we model
and analyze a variety of interventions and combinations of interventions in terms of
costs and efficacy. We also take into consideration reactive strategies incorporating
supply-chain delays, and we identify strategies that effectively contain outbreaks and
costs even in the presence of supply-chain delays, low vaccine efficacy, and low vaccine
coverage.
Our model illustrates the epidemiological effectiveness of a combination strategy
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involving short-term closures of individual schools on an as-needed basis, other practi-
cal social distancing activities, reactive vaccination of 35% or more of the population,
and limited use of antivirals for treatment and prophylaxis. The model also quantifies
the cost savings for this and alternative reactive strategies. Public health authorities
should consider placing renewed emphasis on such combination strategies when re-





LIMIT APPROXIMATION AND THE IMPACT OF
SPATIAL CORRELATION
Control charts are used to determine whether or not a process being monitored is in
a state of statistical control. A charted process typically runs until it exceeds cer-
tain control limits, indicating potential problems that may require corrective actions.
The idea is for the chart to quickly detect an out-of-control state of the process,
while simultaneously avoiding false positives (declaring problems when they do not
actually exist). To this end, we denote by ARL0 the expected number of samples
(average run length) until a false alarm occurs when a monitored process is actually
in control. An out-of-control average run length is denoted as ARL1, and it repre-
sents the expected number of samples until an alarm when an out-of-control process
is monitored. ARL1s are often used as performance measures for timely detection of
an out-of-control process. Generally speaking, procedures having low ARL1s while
simultaneously possessing a pre-specified ARL0 are desirable.
Once control limits are determined given a particular ARL0, statistics constructed
from observations of a monitored process are plotted over time. As long as the
statistics fall within the control limits, the process is assumed to be in control and
no corrective action is necessary. However, a point that plots outside of the control
limits is interpreted as evidence of the out-of-control state, and subsequent analysis of
the control chart can help find the sources of variation, which can then be adjusted to
bring the process back into control. Shewhart-type charts use either raw observations
or averages of a few observations as monitoring statistics, while CUSUM-type charts
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use cumulative sums of observations [34]. There are other types of control charts that
incorporate different forms of statistics; for example, see Lucas and Saccucci [31] and
Woodall et al. [66]. Our interest in this chapter is on CUSUM-type charts.
A CUSUM control chart is a sequential analysis technique suggested by Page [39]
to monitor and detect changes in the parameter of interest. As its name implies, a
CUSUM chart raises an alarm if the cumulative sum statistic exceeds pre-specified
control limits. Since a CUSUM control chart accumulates information given during
the entire monitored time period, it is relatively sensitive to small process shifts. Due
to this proclivity, CUSUM charts have been found to be useful in the area of bio-
surveillance for detecting a slowly emerging disease cluster, which usually does not
result in a sudden large shift in the number of disease counts. Lawson [27], Sonesson
and Bock [50], Tsui et al. [60] and Woodall [64] provide reviews of many statisti-
cal surveillance methods, including CUSUM charts, in public health. Most work
using CUSUM charts assumes that the underlying observations (i.e., the observed
disease counts) follow Poisson or normal distributions, at least approximately. Either
sufficiently large numbers of counts or some transformation to normality might be
necessary to use the normality assumption on the counts.
In biosurveillance, an observation (disease count) is obtained from a region every
time unit. If one monitors only a single region to detect when a disease outbreak
occurs there, and if the collected observations from the single region are univariate,
then a univariate CUSUM chart [39, 40] is used for temporal surveillance of the region.
In the context of temporal surveillance, Fricker et al. [14] compare the performance of
a CUSUM chart against two Shewhart-type charts and one weighted moving average
chart [22, 70]. They find that the CUSUM chart performs significantly better than
the other charts across all scenarios they evaluated. When the observations follow
a Poisson distribution, Han et al. [19] compare the performance of three detection
methods: A scan statistic chart based on a fixed number of most-recent observations, a
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CUSUM chart, and an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) chart. Their
simulation study shows that the CUSUM chart and the EWMA chart outperform the
scan statistic chart.
When the decision maker monitors a number of adjacent regions at the same
time, we now need a spatiotemporal surveillance method to detect when and in which
regions an outbreak occurs. At a given time, each region generates an observation and
we monitor a multidimensional vector formed from these observations, which requires
a multivariate CUSUM (MCUSUM) chart [10, 21, 41]. Several researchers present
various MCUSUM charts for spatiotemporal surveillance. Rodgerson [43] introduces
an MCUSUM chart using a statistic from Tango [59] which can describe the spatial
disease pattern in the entire study region. Rogerson and Yamada [46] compare two
multivariate control chart schemes: running multiple univariate CUSUM charts (one
for each region separately) and running one MCUSUM control chart.
Multiple univariate CUSUM charts [65] are well suited to the situation where
there is little or no spatial correlation, and where changes are anticipated in a rel-
atively small number of regions. On the spatial correlation is strong and can be
well estimated, then the MCUSUM chart may be preferred, raising preferred, rais-
ing alarms faster. This is because statistics in each univariate CUSUM chart are
constructed from observations of a single region, and thus interaction among regions
due to spatial correlation are not reflected in the statistics. In biosurveillance, one
observation from a region often correlates to observations from surrounding regions
due to spatial correlation, and hence an outbreak is likely to develop in a cluster,
i.e., a group of neighboring regions. With this in mind, Rogerson and Yamada [45]
develop a CUSUM chart that uses local statistics. A local statistic is defined as a
weighted sum of observations in a local cluster that is used to detect the outbreak
cluster, where the weights can decline with increasing distance from the center of the
local cluster. Sonesson [49] defines a spatial cluster as a group of regions in a circle
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with a varying radius. However, spatial correlation among regions is not considered.
Following a similar definition of a cluster from Sonesson [49], Jiang et al. [24] relate
existing correlations among regions are present.
Although Jiang et al. [24] propose the promising MCUSUM chart for monitoring
many regions simultaneously while considering correlations among the regions, the
control limit calibration for the chart primarily relies on trial-and-error simulation.
This becomes inconvenient and time-consuming as the number of regions and the
number of clusters become large. In this chapter, we introduce a method that ana-
lytically calculates control limits of the MCUSUM chart from Jiang et al. [24] and
its variation which we call the separated MCUSUM (SMCUSUM) chart. We also
investigate the practical range of the scan radius for the control limit approximation
method.
Most of the spatiotemporal surveillance literature considers detection delay as a
main performance measure of interest, e.g., an ARL1 or a conditional expected delay
[50]. However, the detection delay alone is not a sufficient measure to evaluate the
performance of surveillance methods designed to answer both when and where the
outbreak occurs. Accurate detection of geographical locations of outbreak regions is
as important as prompt detection. Hence, spatial identification accuracy needs to
be measured as well as detection delay. A few papers including Jiang et al. [24] and
Rogerson and Yamada [46] consider spatial correlation among regions with respect
to detection delay, but have not thoroughly studied the impact of spatial correlation
on spatial identification accuracy. In this chapter, we discuss detection delay and
spatial identification accuracy as detection performance measures, and we investigate
the impact of the outbreak radius and spatial correlation on the two performance
measures.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we review MCUSUM charts
that use the concept of spatial clusters in biosurveillance. In Section 3.2, we propose
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MCUSUM charts with an ARL approximation method, which can be used to set
control limits without trial-and-error simulation. Section 3.3 studies the practical
range of the scan radius and the performance of the approximation method. Section
3.4 discusses the performance of the MCUSUM chart under various experimental
configurations, in addition to the impact of the outbreak radius and spatial correlation
on detection performance. A summary and conclusions follow in Section 3.5. The
research conducted in this chapter is in print at IIE Transactions [28].
3.1. Background
In this section, we define notation, introduce our problem, and review an MCUSUM
chart for spatiotemporal biosurveillance that uses statistics constructed from spatial
clusters.
Suppose that p = M ×N regions in a rectangular shape are considered for moni-
toring, and qc = (mc, nc), where mc = 1, . . . , M and nc = 1, . . . , N , represents the
two-dimensional space coordinate of region c in a set P = {1, 2, . . . , p} as shown in
Figure 9. At each time t, a p× 1 observation vector yt = (yt1, yt2, . . . , ytp)′ is moni-
tored. If the baseline mean value in the in-control state, θc, and the marginal variance,
σ2c , of each component ytc are known for all c ∈ P , a standardized observation vector
xt = (xt1, xt2, . . . , xtp)
′ is obtained by setting xtc = (ytc − θc)/σc. The quantity xt
is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution having probability density
function fµ(x) with a mean vector µ and known variance-covariance matrix Σ, which
is constant over times t = 1, 2, . . .. Since the observation vectors are standardized,
the variance-covariance matrix and the correlation matrix are interchangeable.
Each component of xt corresponds to a standardized observation from each spatial
region at time t, so an MCUSUM chart on xt (or a subset of xt) can be constructed
for spatiotemporal biosurveillance [60, 61]. MCUSUM charts are developed to detect
a shift as soon as possible after an unknown change time ν when the null parameter
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c              qc = (mc, nc)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (1, 6) (1, 7)
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 6) (2, 7)
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 (3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (3, 6) (3, 7)
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5) (4, 6) (4, 7)
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 (5, 1) (5, 2) (5, 3) (5, 4) (5, 5) (5, 6) (5, 7)
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 (6, 1) (6, 2) (6, 3) (6, 4) (6, 5) (6, 6) (6, 7)
43 44 45 46 47 48 49 (7, 1) (7, 2) (7, 3) (7, 4) (7, 5) (7, 6) (7, 7)
Figure 9: Coordinate expression of regions (p = 7× 7)
µ0 = 0 is shifted to the alternative parameter µ1, which indicates an out-of-control
state.
Under the assumption that the shape of the outbreak coverage is a circle, Jiang et
al. [24] define possible spatial clusters of outbreak regions as Oc,r ≡ {j | dist(qj, qc) ≤
r, j ∈ P} with scan radius r from region c, where dist(a, b) denotes the Euclidean
distance between a and b. Since the center of the circle-shaped coverage is located
in c, hereafter, we call c the center region. Note that the scan radius r can be either






or bounded by a given upper limit ru. However, since the number of regions in O
c,r
changes only at certain values of r such as 0, 1,
√
2, 2, and so on, it is good enough for
practical purposes to consider a finite number of possible values for r. Let R denote
the set of possible settings for r, i.e., R = {r1, r2, . . . , ru}, where u is the cardinality
of R.
When a possible outbreak cluster Oc,r is scanned, we test if the mean levels of the
regions in Oc,r are shifted, while the mean levels of the other regions are the same as
for the in-control state. Different shift vectors µc,r are considered for different O
c,r
choices, and a set of possible shift vectors can be defined as {µc,r | c ∈ P , r ∈ R}.
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Then, a CUSUM chart is designed to detect a shift from µ0 to µc,r.





















, i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
When a homogeneous shift magnitude δ > 0 is assumed over all outbreak regions,
the jth component of µc,r is δ if j ∈ Oc,r and 0 otherwise. An alarm is signaled as soon
as S∗∗t > h
∗∗, where h∗∗ is a control limit that determines the operating characteristics
of the monitoring chart. When a signal is raised for the first time, we record (i) the
current time t as the time when the control chart detects the shift and (ii) ν∗ as the
estimated change time though the true change time ν is still unknown. It is notable
that Sc,rt itself is an MCUSUM statistic that can be calculated recursively by




t ), t = 1, 2, . . . ,
where Sc,r0 = 0 for all c ∈ P and r ∈ R. Therefore, one MCUSUM statistic is recorded
for each spatial cluster, and the maximum of all pu of the MCUSUM statistics is used
as the monitoring statistic S∗∗t . Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, we call the
control chart monitoring S∗∗t the JMCUSUM chart.
Jiang et al. [24] test their JMCUSUM chart under various configurations of out-
break coverage, shift magnitude, correlations among regions, and scan radius. For a
given shift, the best (smallest) ARL1 is observed when the scan radius r matches the
radius of the actual outbreak coverage, rout. Therefore, using the correct scan radius
is important for detecting an outbreak cluster quickly, and the use of a fixed scan
radius is recommended if the outbreak radius is known. If no information is available
for the outbreak radius, using a variable scan radius seems better than using a fixed
scan radius whose value can be quite different than the true outbreak radius. When
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using the variable scan radius, the range of the scan radius should be chosen carefully
— to be wide enough to include the actual outbreak radius, but not too wide to
hinder the detection power of the analysis.
One of the critical decisions that must be made in designing a control chart is that
of specifying a control limit, e.g., the control limit h∗∗ for S∗∗t . In order to find the
appropriate control limit that yields a target ARL0, researchers often rely on tedious
trial-and-error simulation, as do Jiang et al. [24]. These simulations can be very
time-consuming, especially in the JMCUSUM chart that uses statistics constructed
from spatial clusters with different sizes, because the computational burden greatly
increases as the numbers of monitoring regions and radius settings increase. If the
control limits can be found quickly, we can save a great deal of time in setting up the
JMCUSUM chart for spatiotemporal biosurveillance.
3.2. Design of the JMCUSUM Chart
In this section, we use an analytical approximation to search for the control limits of
an MCUSUM chart.
By expanding a formula which approximates ARLs of a CUSUM chart in Kim et
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(3.2.1)





, and H is the control limit of the MCUSUM
statistic Sc,rt . Note that H is not necessarily the same as h
∗∗. We can analytically
calculate control limits, and even ARL1s of S
∗∗
t in some special cases, using Equa-
tion (3.2.1). Since the solution of Equatio (3.2.1) does not exist in a closed form, one
may refer to Rogerson [44] for a direct approximation or use a numerical approach.
We take the latter approach to solve the equation.
39
3.2.1 Fixed Scan Radius
If rout is known, Jiang et al. [24] recommend fixing r = rout for good ARL1 performance
of the JMCUSUM chart. When r is fixed, our monitoring statistic becomes
S∗∗t = max
c
Sc,rt , t = 1, 2, . . . .
This means that the number of possible spatial clusters Oc,r is reduced to p, and one
MCUSUM statistic, Sc,rt , is monitored for each spatial cluster. An alarm is raised
when any of the p MCUSUM statistics exceed a common control limit h∗∗. If an
alarm is incurred by Sc,rt , then c is considered to be the center of the outbreak.
When an ARL0 for S
c,r
t is specified and the monitored process is in control, Equa-
tion (3.2.1) easily enables us to approximate H for Sc,rt . Therefore, if we monitor only
one spatial cluster Oc
∗,r, then S∗∗t = S
c∗,r
t , and we can set h
∗∗ = H directly. However,
finding h∗∗ yielding a target ARL0 for S
∗∗
t is no longer a simple matter if we monitor
more than one cluster.
Suppose we monitor p > 1 spatial clusters at the same time. Then the run length
of S∗∗t becomes equivalent to the minimum run length of p MCUSUM statistics,
and this implies that an ARL0 for each S
c,r
t should be set to a much larger value
than the targeted ARL0 for S
∗∗
t . When we assume independence among the S
c,r
t for
c ∈ P , we can expect that the run length of Sc,rt is approximately p times longer
than the run length of S∗∗t . For this reason, we can obtain h
∗∗ by calculating the H
value that yields an average run length of pARL0 for S
c,r
t . This ARL0 adjustment
is similar to a Bonferroni adjustment mentioned in David [11] and Rogerson and
Yamada [46]. Note that the Sc,rt s may not be independent and the approximation
quality can be diminished if r > 0 or positive spatial correlation exists. In any case,
the JMCUSUM chart for the fixed scan radius, denoted as the JMCUSUM-F chart,
can be implemented as follows.
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The JMCUSUM-F chart
1. Pick any spatial cluster Oc,r. Then
(a) Solve Equation (3.2.1) for H using the corresponding Sc,rt with pARL0.
(b) Set h∗∗ = H.
2. Raise an alarm at t if S∗∗t > h
∗∗.
After h∗∗ is obtained, Equation (3.2.1) can be used again to approximate the
ARL1 of the JMCUSUM-F chart, denoted as ARL
JF
1 . In the out-of-control state, xt
is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with parameters µ1 and Σ.
The quantity ARLJF1 can be approximated by the minimum of the ARL1s calculated
for c ∈ P with the shift vector µ1, which is likely to be achieved at the outbreak
center. In Section 3.4, we will confirm that most of the alarms are truly raised by
one spatial cluster whose center matches the outbreak center; and thus the ARL1
approximation method based on that cluster is acceptable when r is fixed.
3.2.2 Variable Scan Radius
If rout is unknown, the use of a variable r is recommended. Let us denote the
JMCUSUM chart with the variable scan radius as the JMCUSUM-V chart. In this
case, S∗∗t becomes equivalent to the maximum of pu MCUSUM statistics, and an
alarm is raised as soon as any of the pu MCUSUM statistics hits a common control
limit h∗∗ calibrated by trial-and-error simulation. If an alarm is incurred by Sc,rt , then
c is considered as the center of the outbreak and r is interpreted as the radius of the
detected outbreak cluster.
Since the number of nonzero components in µc,r depends on r, Equation (3.2.1)
provides different control limits for different r settings. For this reason, unlike the
JMCUSUM-F chart, it is not easy to analytically approximate a common control
limit h∗∗ for the JMCUSUM-V chart. Instead, we suggest a new MCUSUM chart
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that does not require the common control limit h∗∗.
From Table I in Jiang et al. [24], we notice the empirical fact that the ARL1
performance of the JMCUSUM-V chart seems to be close to the minimum of the
ARL1s of various JMCUSUM-F charts, each applied with r = r1, r = r2, . . . , and
r = ru, respectively. The minimum is usually achieved when the center of a spatial
cluster matches the outbreak center and r = rout no matter what rout is tested. This
can be interpreted to mean that the JMCUSUM-V chart behaves like a mixture of the
multiple JMCUSUM-F charts. Based on this intuition, we suggest a new MCUSUM
chart named the separated-MCUSUM (SMCUSUM) which develops an MCUSUM
control chart for each scan radius r ∈ R separately:
S∗rt ≡ max
c
Sc,rt , t = 1, 2, . . . .
Then the SMCUSUM chart is implemented as follows.
The SMCUSUM chart
1. For each r ∈ R,
(a) Pick any spatial cluster Oc,r.
(b) Solve Equation (3.2.1) for H using the corresponding Sc,rt with puARL0.
(c) Set h∗r = H.
2. Raise an alarm at t if any S∗rt ≥ h∗r for r ∈ R.
Note that the JMCUSUM-F chart with an analytical control limit can be a special
case of the SMCUSUM chart. In Section 3.3, we will show by experimentation that
the ARL0s of the SMCUSUM chart are indeed close to the target ARL0. The good
news is that, by using the SMCUSUM chart, we do not need to search for h∗∗ via
trial-and-error simulation. This advantage saves significant time, especially when we
deal with large problems with numerous possible values of the scan radius r.
42
3.3. Approximation Accuracy
In this section, we test the accuracy of the control limit and ARL1 approximations
under various experimental configurations.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
We construct an archetypal example with 7 × 7 and 20 × 20 regions. The target
ARL0 is set to 100 and 370, respectively. The range of the scan radius r is discussed
in the next subsection. For the out-of-control state, we assume a homogeneous shift
magnitude with δ = 1, and consider outbreak clusters with various rout values when
the outbreak center cout is located at the center of the 7×7 regional system (region 25).
Figure 10 illustrates outbreak regions with cout = 25 colored in gray for rout = 0, 1, 2.
We consider two different correlation structures. The first correlation structure Σ1
denotes the p×p correlation matrix given in Jiang et al. [24], where any pair of adjacent
regions has a correlation coefficient 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, any two cross-adjacent regions have
correlation coefficient ρ/2, and any other pairs of regions have no correlation. For the
second correlation structure Σ2, any pair of regions has a correlation coefficient that
depends on the distance between the regions. Specifically, the (α, β)th element of Σ2
is ρdist(qα,qβ) for α, β ∈ P . Figure 11 illustrates the different correlation settings of Σ1
and Σ2 for region 25, which correspond to the 25th rows of Σ1 and Σ2, respectively. We
rout = 0          rout = 1         rout = 2 
Figure 10: Outbreak clusters when cout = 25 (outbreak regions are in gray)
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Figure 11: Correlation settings of Σ1 and Σ2 for region 25
run our examples with spatial correlation parameter ρ = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.7. However,
the eigenvalues of Σ1 approach zero or become negative when ρ ≥ 0.5, which results
in an ill-conditioned Σ1. Thus, we restrict ρ < 0.5 for Σ1.
Note that the number of regions in a cluster can be smaller near the edge of the
study area. In order to keep the same number of regions in each cluster, we have added
dummy regions. For example, we actually simulate 9 × 9 regions to monitor 7 × 7
regions with r = 2. Moreover, we conduct 100,000 replications of each experiment to
calibrate empirical control limits, and 10,000 replications to obtain empirical ARLs
(either ARL0 or ARL1). All analytical control limits and ARL1s are calculated by
solving Equation (3.2.1) for S25,rt .
Hereafter, we mainly focus on the experimental results based on the case with
p = 7 × 7 and ARL0 = 100, while other results with additional parameters (e.g.,
p = 20× 20 or the target ARL0 = 370) are reported in Appendix B.
3.3.2 Range of the Scan Radius
The performance of the JMCUSUM-F chart depends heavily on the accuracy of Equa-
tion (3.2.1). For this reason, we determine the practical range of the scan radius
r by studying how the accuracy of Equation (3.2.1) changes as r increases in the
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JMCUSUM-F chart. Note that the JMCUSUM-F chart essentially runs p MCUSUM
charts at the same time and stops when any of the MCUSUM charts signals an out-
of-control alarm. We calculate analytical control limits from Equation (3.2.1) when
the overall target ARL0 is 100, 370, or 700. The case ARL0 = 700 is additionally
considered in this section to study the impact of the target ARL0. Then, we record
the ratios of the empirical ARL0 to the target ARL0 for a single MCUSUM chart and




5 when δ = 1 and
ρ = 0.
From Section 3.1, we know that one MCUSUM statistic is based on the cumula-
tive sum of `c,ri = µ
′
c,rΣ
−1 (xi − µc,r/2). We see that the single MCUSUM chart is













−1µc,r is the standard
deviation of `c,ri . For δ > 0 and 0 ≤ ρ < 1, a large value of r increases the standard
deviation of `c,ri ; and since k is proportional to the standard deviation of `
c,r
i , k also
increases as r increases. Table 9 illustrates the relationship between r and k when
δ = 1 and ρ = 0.
Figure 12 depicts the impact of r on the accuracy of Equation (3.2.1) for a single
MCUSUM chart with various target ARL0s. It shows that the ratio of the empirical
ARL0 to the target ARL0 decreases until r reaches 2. Figure 13 shows that the ratio
decreases as the reference value k for a classical CUSUM chart increases up to about
k = 1.8; Rogerson [44] also reports a similar decreasing trend as k increases for a
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Figure 13: Empirical ARL0
Target ARL0
(%) versus k for a single MCUSUMchart
classical CUSUM chart. One can easily see that Figures 12 and 13 match well. For
example, the ratio of ARL0s is approximately 80% when r =
√
2 in Figure 12, and
the ratio is also about 80% when k = 1.5 in Figure 13.
The ratio graphs having different target ARL0s start to behave quite differently
when r > 2 and k > 2 as shown in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. From Figure 12,
there can be more than a 30% drop in ARL0 from the target when r > 2. However,
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Figure 14: Empirical ARL0
Target ARL0
(%) versus r for the JMCUSUM-F chart
consider the performance of the JMCUSUM-F chart where dependence among the
MCUSUM statistics exists.
In spatiotemporal monitoring, dependence among MCUSUM statistics is natural
due to overlapping regions among clusters or spatial correlation. The dependence
among the MCUSUM statistics becomes stronger as r or ρ increase. Figure 14 depicts
the performance of the JMCUSUM-F chart with p = 7× 7, δ = 1, ρ = 0, and target
ARL0 = 100, 370, and 700. By comparing Figures 12 and 14, we see that the positive
dependence among the MCUSUM statistics (due to overlapping regions) tends to shift
the graphs of ARL0 ratios in Figure 12 in the upward direction while keeping their
overall shapes over r. We also notice that the tendency strengthens as r increases.
Figure 14 shows that the ratios are within a 10% difference of the target for various
ARL0s when r is small (i.e., 0, 1,
√
2), but the ratios deviate more from the target
when r is large. This implies that the target ARL0 does not significantly affect the
accuracy of the approximation method if k is small. By considering the upward trend
due to dependence and the impact of the target ARL0, we recommend the use of r
such that k ≤ 2 when p = 7× 7 and ρ = 0. Now, we explain the impacts of ρ and p.
• Spatial correlation ρ changes the standard deviation of `c,ri and thus the values
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of k. Therefore, for a given ρ > 0, we recommend that one ought to calculate k
and find the range of r such that k ≤ 2. For example, if ρ = 0.2, then k ≈ 1.8
for r =
√
8, and k ≈ 2 for r = 3 under the correlation structure Σ2. The ratios
of the empirical ARL0 to the target are 90.62% and 84.66%, respectively. Thus,
in this case, one can use r up to 3 expecting no more than a 20% drop in the
empirical ARL0 from the target.
• Appendix B provides figures similar to Figures 12 and 14 for the case p = 20×20.
The figures show that there is still a shift in the upward direction, but the shift
amount is smaller for p = 20× 20 when compared to p = 7× 7. This is because
there are more MCUSUM statistics with fewer overlapping regions, and overall
dependence among MCUSUM statistics diminishes with large p. Thus, the
range of k ≤ 2 is still recommended.
Following the recommendation, we test r up to 2 (i.e., ru = 2), which ensures
k ≤ 2 for all values of ρ considered; and we set the largest rout = 2 as well. As a
consequence, we test the SMCUSUM chart with r ∈ R = {0, 1,
√
2, 2}.
3.3.3 Results for the Fixed Scan Radius Case
We summarize some of our main results.
Control limits : Empirically and analytically evaluated control limits are pre-
sented in Table 10 under different configurations with a fixed scan radius. Although
the Sc,rt s for different spatial clusters are no longer independent if r > 0 or ρ > 0,
the empirical control limits match the analytical control limits well. The analytical
approximation exhibits excellent performance, especially when ρ < 0.5.
In-control average run length : Before delivering test results for ARLJF1 s, we
need to confirm that the targeted ARL0 is truly achieved with the analytical control
limits. Empirical ARL0s of the JMCUSUM-F chart with analytical h
∗∗ are reported
in Table 11. No matter what correlation structure is used, the results in Table 11
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Table 10: Empirical h∗∗ (Analytical h∗∗) when r is fixed
Σ1 Σ2
ρ r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2
0.0 6.55 (6.64) 6.79 (6.81) 6.28 (6.17) 6.56 (6.64) 6.79 (6.81) 6.28 (6.17)
0.2 6.63 (6.70) 6.86 (6.86) 6.62 (6.52) 6.62 (6.70) 6.86 (6.86) 6.66 (6.55)
0.4 6.83 (6.86) 6.78 (6.74) 6.58 (6.38) 6.77 (6.80) 6.85 (6.82) 6.70 (6.56)
0.7 – – – 6.89 (6.87) 6.65 (6.43) 6.29 (5.94)
Table 11: Empirical ARL0 of the JMCUSUM-F chart with analytical h
∗∗
Σ1 Σ2
ρ r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2
0.0 107.82 103.29 91.55 107.80 99.56 90.74
0.2 106.85 101.34 90.98 106.53 99.51 90.42
0.4 104.05 93.49 83.41 104.72 97.96 86.01
0.7 – – – 98.33 80.28 72.13
provide values close to 100 (i.e., the targeted ARL0) when ρ < 0.5. The case in which
ρ > 0.5 is tested as well for Σ2. However, the approximation quality seems diminished
for such high ρ compared to the results for ρ < 0.5. As ρ and r become larger, stronger
positive correlation occurs between spatial clusters and therefore smaller ARL0s are
observed.
Out-of-control average run length : In Section 3.2.1, we suggest an analytical
method to approximate ARL1s for the fixed scan radius case. Analytical ARL
JF
1 s
are compared to empirical ARLJF1 s in Table 12. To see the gap caused by the ARL1
approximation but not by the control limit approximation, analytical control limits
are used to obtain both empirical and analytical ARLJF1 s. Although the JMCUSUM-F
chart yields some deviations of ARL0s from 100 (Table 11), ARL
JF
1 s for both methods
exhibit no significant difference (Table 12).
Additional ARL results for the JMCUSUM-F chart with p = 7 × 7 and 20 × 20,
target ARL0 = 100, 370, and ρ = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.7 are provided in Appendix B.
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Table 12: Empirical ARLJF1 (Analytical ARL
JF
1 ) with analytical h
∗∗
Σ1 Σ2
ρ r = rout = 0 r = rout = 1 r = rout = 2 r = rout = 0 r = rout = 1 r = rout = 2
0.0 13.34 (13.62) 3.33 (3.37) 1.49 (1.44) 13.29 (13.61) 3.37 (3.36) 1.47 (1.44)
0.2 11.66 (11.86) 4.06 (4.04) 2.07 (2.05) 11.82 (12.05) 4.04 (4.02) 2.15 (2.11)
0.4 6.88 (6.96) 2.88 (2.86) 1.81 (1.74) 8.88 (9.03) 3.54 (3.52) 2.21 (2.15)
0.7 – – – 4.44 (4.37) 1.93 (1.84) 1.33 (1.22)
3.3.4 Results for the Variable Scan Radius Case
In Section 3.2.2, we presented the SMCUSUM chart using a separate analytical control
limit h∗r instead of a common control limit h∗∗. In order to compare the performance
of the SMCUSUM chart to that of the JMCUSUM-V chart, ARL0s and ARL1s for
the SMCUSUM chart are reported in Tables 13 and 14.
In Table 13, the SMCUSUM chart results in actual ARL0s close to the target
ARL0 = 100. Similar to the fixed scan radius case, smaller ARL0s are observed
in Table 13 as the spatial correlation parameter, ρ, increases. In Table 14, ARLJV1
(ARLS1) represents an empirical ARL1 achieved by the JMCUSUM-V (SMCUSUM)
chart from 10,000 replications. Although the SMCUSUM chart gives slightly larger
(smaller) ARL0s for ρ < 0.5 (ρ > 0.5) than the target ARL0 (Table 13), its ARL1
performance is very close to that of the JMCUSUM-V chart (Table 14). Thus, the
SMCUSUM chart provides similar performance to the JMCUSUM-V chart, but al-
lows for analytical control limits — so that it is more convenient to implement the
SMCUSUM chart than the JMCUSUM-V chart.
Next, we confirm that ARLS1 is similar to the minimum of the ARL1s associated
with the JMCUSUM-F charts, each applied with r = 0, 1,
√
2, 2, respectively. Both
empirical and analytical ARLJF1 s of the JMCUSUM-F charts are obtained for outbreak
scenarios with rout = 0, 1, 2. For each value of rout, we note that the JMCUSUM-F
chart with r = rout gives the minimum of the ARL
JF
1 s. The minimum ARL
JF
1 s are















ρ rout = 0 rout = 1 rout = 2 rout = 0 rout = 1 rout = 2
0.0 14.60 (15.05) 3.66 (3.79) 1.67 (1.73) 14.50 (15.23) 3.62 (3.76) 1.72 (1.73)
0.2 13.40 (13.23) 4.60 (4.62) 2.42 (2.60) 13.30 (13.56) 4.48 (4.61) 2.50 (2.67)
0.4 8.03 (7.88) 3.39 (3.33) 2.20 (2.47) 10.10 (10.21) 4.08 (4.12) 2.60 (2.89)
0.7 – – – 4.94 (5.01) 2.26 (2.22) 1.59 (1.81)
14. For example, when Σ1 is used with rout = 1 and ρ = 0.2, the minimum empirical
(analytical) ARLJF1 is 4.06 (4.04), which is only slightly smaller than the empirical
ARLJV1 (ARL
S
1), 4.60 (4.62). The ARL
S
1s tend to be slightly larger than the minimum
ARLJF1 s for the configurations we tested, but the differences are not significant, sup-
porting our conjecture in Section 3.2.2. The same tendency is observed for ARLJV1 s
as well.
Additional ARL results for the SMCUSUM chart are provided in Appendix B for
p = 7× 7 and 20× 20, with target ARL0 = 100, 370 and ρ = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.7.
3.4. Impact of Spatial Correlation on Detection Perfor-
mance
This section investigates the impact of correlation on detection performance as mea-
sured by detection delay and spatial identification accuracy, using the JMCUSUM-F
and SMCUSUM charts.
For a control chart used in spatiotemporal biosurveillance, two important ques-
tions are: (i) how quickly does the chart detect an outbreak? and (ii) how accurate is
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the chart in identifying the outbreak cluster? ARL1s are a generally accepted measure
of detection delay and thus can be used to answer the first question.
To answer the second question, we focus on two spatial identification accuracy
measures: the correct alarm percentage (CP) giving the proportion of time that a
chart exactly detects the true outbreak cluster with the correct center and radius;
and the sum of the alarm percentages (SP) that detect a cluster including all of the
outbreak regions — in the context of contagious disease surveillance, the outcome
we most want to avoid is that of missing any outbreak region. Other identification
accuracy measures for spatial cluster detection can be found in the literature. For
example, Gangnon and Clayton [15] report the proportion of time that their methods
detect at least one, half of, or all outbreak regions in the outbreak cluster. Gangnon
and Clayton [16] also discuss the power of their likelihood ratio tests (i.e., cluster
detection rates from known clustering models).
In order to investigate the relationship between detection performance and spatial
correlation, we run a series of experiments under various scenarios. The detection
performance is tested under the same experimental setup from Section 3.3.1, but
with one additional value of δ = 0.5. We use the JMCUSUM-F chart from Section
3.2.1 for the fixed scan radius case, and the SMCUSUM chart from Section 3.2.2
for the variable scan radius case. As a measure of detection delay, ARL1s for each
configuration are presented in the last four columns of Tables 15 and 16. All of the
ARL1s reported in the tables are empirically obtained by simulation with analytical
control limits based on 10,000 replications. As measures of identification accuracy,
Tables 15 and 16 report values of CP and SP under the correlation structures Σ1 and
Σ2, respectively.
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Table 15: Identification accuracy CP (SP) with Σ1
CP (SP) Empirical ARL1
δ ρ rout r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = var r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = var
0.5
0.0
0 83.73 (83.73) – (49.61) – (47.47) 63.93 (81.63) 40.02 71.34 93.75 44.87
1 – 85.89 (85.89) – (73.06) 68.74 (83.59) 22.85 10.67 18.75 12.27
2 – – 73.89 (73.89) 65.52 (65.52) 17.94 6.90 4.63 5.67
0.2
0 86.81 (86.81) – (52.19) – (50.84) 66.91 (83.69) 35.53 70.67 88.82 40.04
1 – 89.16 (89.16) – (69.49) 77.30 (85.86) 28.15 12.94 25.81 15.09
2 – – 83.09 (83.09) 76.17 (76.17) 24.29 11.38 6.62 8.35
0.4
0 91.26 (91.26) – (62.88) – (57.73) 74.17 (89.39) 21.90 52.27 73.64 25.65
1 – 89.65 (89.65) – (65.15) 85.73 (89.95) 18.64 9.26 19.10 10.96
2 – – 87.26 (87.26) 78.93 (78.93) 17.48 10.21 5.76 7.77
1.0
0.0
0 95.40 (95.40) – (61.65) – (51.16) 82.24 (91.97) 13.34 46.18 59.90 15.05
1 – 92.39 (92.39) – (80.73) 79.05 (88.62) 7.65 3.33 7.23 3.79
2 – – 81.89 (81.89) 71.42 (71.42) 6.10 2.26 1.47 1.73
0.2
0 96.14 (96.14) – (64.42) – (56.46) 85.40 (93.71) 11.66 45.17 62.48 13.23
1 – 95.43 (95.43) – (78.38) 87.72 (92.84) 9.68 4.06 10.55 4.62
2 – – 89.59 (89.59) 81.18 (81.18) 8.34 3.74 2.07 2.60
0.4
0 96.99 (96.99) – (76.44) – (62.57) 87.76 (96.04) 6.88 27.57 45.76 7.88
1 – 94.66 (94.66) – (73.62) 92.52 (94.74) 6.14 2.88 7.41 3.33
2 – – 91.50 (91.50) 81.77 (81.77) 5.97 3.36 1.81 2.47
Table 16: Identification accuracy CP (SP) with Σ2
CP (SP) Empirical ARL1
δ ρ rout r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = var r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = var
0.5
0.0
0 84.17 (84.17) – (49.56) – (47.64) 63.71 (81.02) 40.40 72.06 94.72 44.87
1 – 85.93 (85.93) – (72.41) 68.11 (82.69) 22.70 10.70 18.68 12.40
2 – – 73.48 (73.48) 64.55 (64.55) 17.88 6.90 4.65 5.65
0.2
0 86.88 (86.88) – (52.41) – (53.64) 67.43 (83.69) 36.16 71.24 89.39 41.08
1 – 90.60 (90.60) – (71.55) 79.75 (87.79) 28.16 12.91 26.13 15.15
2 – – 85.67 (85.67) 78.98 (78.98) 24.79 12.04 6.82 8.57
0.4
0 89.90 (89.90) – (56.53) – (57.98) 72.01 (87.40) 27.80 64.37 78.95 31.82
1 – 92.69 (92.69) – (69.53) 87.19 (91.95) 25.46 11.50 28.49 13.52
2 – – 91.48 (91.48) 84.84 (84.84) 22.69 15.07 7.12 9.22
1.0
0.0
0 94.75 (94.75) – (60.90) – (52.04) 82.66 (91.90) 13.29 46.06 62.09 15.23
1 – 92.70 (92.70) – (81.68) 79.06 (88.65) 7.57 3.37 7.24 3.76
2 – – 82.00 (82.00) 70.93 (70.93) 6.03 2.25 1.47 1.73
0.2
0 95.62 (95.62) – (65.51) – (56.40) 85.17 (93.69) 11.82 45.85 63.03 13.56
1 – 96.08 (96.08) – (81.14) 88.50 (93.57) 9.62 4.04 11.24 4.61
2 – – 91.70 (91.70) 83.22 (83.22) 8.55 4.01 2.15 2.67
0.4
0 97.18 (97.18) – (70.15) – (63.50) 88.22 (95.46) 8.88 38.39 54.55 10.21
1 – 97.09 (97.09) – (79.22) 93.61 (96.07) 8.74 3.54 12.44 4.12
2 – – 95.31 (95.31) 87.27 (87.27) 7.82 5.13 2.21 2.89
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3.4.1 Outbreak Radius
With respect to the ARL1s in Tables 15 and 16, it is easy to see the importance of
matching the scan radius to the actual outbreak radius. The use of the fixed scan
radius r = rout always results in the smallest ARL1s and the largest alarm percentages
under all configurations tested. The SMCUSUM chart with a variable scan radius
always provides the second-best ARL1s. With respect to spatial identification accu-
racy, the alarm percentages when using the variable scan radius are not as good as
those with the fixed scan radius r = rout, but give reasonably high values, especially
when the correlation is high. If the radius of the real outbreak increases, then both
the JMCUSUM-F and SMCUSUM charts raise an alarm more quickly. However, the
values of CP and SP decrease as rout increases. There is not much difference between
the experimental results for Σ1 and Σ2, except that the ARL1s decrease more slowly
as ρ increases when Σ2 is used.
3.4.2 Spatial Correlation
To see the impact of spatial correlation on both the ARL1 and alarm percentages more
clearly, we depict the results of the fixed scan radius case. Figure 15 shows the ARL1
and CP as functions of correlation for rout = 0, 1, 2 with δ = 1 and Σ2. In Figure 15,
the ARL1 does not have a monotonic relationship with spatial correlation, but the
CP increases as correlation increases. This shows that positive correlation does not
always support faster detection but helps accurate identification. (The same ARL1
and CP patterns appear with the variable scan radius.) Regarding the relationship
between spatial correlation and ARL1s, one can find a similar conclusion in Rogerson
and Yamada [46], although the authors use different MCUSUM charts than ours. We
drew graphs of ARL1 and SP versus spatial correlation with different δ and Σ1 values,
which are not reported in this thesis, and we observed similar patterns. These results
imply that faster detection does not guarantee accurate identification.
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Figure 15: Spatial correlation vs. ARL1 and CP with δ = 1 and Σ2
3.5. Conclusions
We propose a method to calculate approximate control limits for the JMCUSUM-F
chart where the scan radius is fixed, and to study the range of the scan radius where
the method works well. A new MCUSUM chart is also proposed for the case of a
variable scan radius, namely, the SMCUSUM chart, whose performance is similar to
the JMCUSUM-V chart but calculates control limits analytically. By using the pro-
posed charts, one can avoid cumbersome time-consuming trial-and-error simulation
to calibrate control limits, which makes the use of MCUSUM charts more convenient
in practice.
In addition, we introduce the correct alarm percentage and the sum of alarm per-
centages to evaluate identification accuracy of the proposed charts for biosurveillance;
and we study the impact of the outbreak radius and spatial correlation on ARL1s and
identification accuracy.
The experimental results show that matching r to rout is important not only with
regard to ARL1s, but also for identification accuracy. Using a chart designed for the
variable scan radius case is a safer choice for both ARL1 and identification accuracy
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if rout is unknown. Larger rout helps fast detection but makes identification of the
outbreak cluster difficult. On the other hand, we find that higher spatial correlation
does not always help faster detection, but it does help accurate identification.
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Chapter IV
ROBUST DISTRIBUTION-FREE MCUSUM CHARTS
FOR SPATIOTEMPORAL BIOSURVEILLANCE IN THE
PRESENCE OF SPATIAL CORRELATION
In Chapter 3, we focused on an analytical method to approximate the control limits
in order to overcome the fact that many MCUSUM charts rely on time-consuming
trial-and-error simulations to search for their control limits. Based on the MCUSUM
chart developed by Jiang et al. [24] (the JMCUSUM chart), we suggested another
MCUSUM chart, named the SMCUSUM chart, that applies analytical control limits
separately to each of the group of MCUSUM charts having the same scan radius. We
tested our method under various configurations of outbreak coverage, shift magnitude,
spatial correlations among regions, and scan radius. The control limit approximation
method works well in a certain range of radius values, while the ARL1 performance
of the SMCUSUM charts is similar to that of the JMCUSUM charts.
In this chapter, we design and develop a new MCUSUM chart, namely, the Robust-
MCUSUM (RMCUSUM) chart, motivated from the JMCUSUM and SMCUSUM
charts. Our new method searches for the control limits of the correlated MCUSUM
charts for any underlying distribution of data (i.e., distribution-free) and any range of
scan radius. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 defines notation and the
problem itself, reviews the monitoring statistics of the JMCUSUM and SMCUSUM
charts, and gives motivating examples. Section 4.2 presents our new RMCUSUM
chart, and then Section 4.3 delivers the experimental setup and results to test the
performance of the RMCUSUM chart. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter.
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4.1. Background and Motivation
As background, we first define the notation needed to describe the problem and the
RMCUSUM chart. Then we explain how our motivation arises from the JMCUSUM
and SMCUSUM charts.
4.1.1 Notation and Problem
We consider p = M × N regions in a rectangular shape for monitoring. The two-
dimensional space coordinate of region c in a set P = {1, 2, . . . , p} is denoted as qc =
(mc, nc), where mc = 1, . . . , M and nc = 1, . . . , N (See Figure 16). At each time
t, an observation vector yt = (yt1, yt2, . . . , ytp)
′ is monitored from p regions. If the
baseline mean value in the in-control state, θc, and the marginal variance, σ
2
c , of each
component ytc are known for all c ∈ P , we obtain a standardized observation vector
xt = (xt1, xt2, . . . , xtp)
′ by setting xtc = (ytc − θc)/σc. The quantity xt is assumed
to follow a multivariate distribution having probability density function fµ(x) with a
mean vector µ and known variance-covariance matrix Σ. We assume that Σ does not
change over times t = 1, 2, . . ., while µ can change when there is a shift. With the
standardized observation vectors, the variance-covariance matrix and the correlation
matrix are interchangeable.
Since each component of xt corresponds to a standardized observation from each
spatial region at time t, we can construct an MCUSUM chart on xt (or a subset of
xt) for spatiotemporal biosurveillance. The MCUSUM chart is developed to detect
a shift as soon as possible after the null parameter µ0 = 0 in the in–control state is
shifted to the alternative parameter µ1 (which indicates an out–of–control state) at
an unknown change time ν.
Employing the assumption from Jiang et al. [24] that the shape of the outbreak
coverage is a circle, we define possible spatial clusters of outbreak regions as Oc,r ≡
{j | dist(qj, qc) ≤ r, j ∈ P} with scan radius r from region c, where dist(a, b) denotes
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c              qc = (mc, nc)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (1, 6) (1, 7)
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 6) (2, 7)
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 (3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (3, 6) (3, 7)
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5) (4, 6) (4, 7)
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 (5, 1) (5, 2) (5, 3) (5, 4) (5, 5) (5, 6) (5, 7)
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 (6, 1) (6, 2) (6, 3) (6, 4) (6, 5) (6, 6) (6, 7)
43 44 45 46 47 48 49 (7, 1) (7, 2) (7, 3) (7, 4) (7, 5) (7, 6) (7, 7)
Figure 16: Coordinate expression of regions (p = 7× 7)
the Euclidean distance between a and b. Since the center of the circle-shaped coverage
is located in c, let c denote the center region of the outbreak cluster Oc,r.
The scan radius r can be either constant or variable. When r is variable, r can






or bounded by a given upper limit ru. However,
since the number of regions in Oc,r changes only at certain values of r, we consider
a finite number of possible values of r such as 0, 1,
√
2, 2, and so on for practical
purposes. Let R denote the set of possible settings for r, i.e., R = {r1, r2, . . . , ru},
where u is the cardinality of R.
We scan each possible outbreak cluster Oc,r and test if the mean levels of the
regions in Oc,r are shifted, assuming the mean levels of the other regions stay in the
in-control state. For different Oc,r choices, different shift vectors µc,r are considered,
and a set of possible shift vectors is defined as {µc,r | c ∈ P , r ∈ R}. When a
homogeneous shift magnitude δ > 0 is assumed over all outbreak regions, the jth
component of µc,r is δ if j ∈ Oc,r and 0 otherwise. An MCUSUM chart is designed
to detect a shift from µ0 to µc,r as soon as possible.
In advance of presenting the RMCUSUM chart in Section 4.2, we introduce some
additional notation and assumptions.
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Suppose the discrete-time stochastic process {Yi : i = 1, 2, . . .} has a steady-
state distribution with marginal mean E[Yi] and marginal variance Var[Yi]. Then the
standardized CUSUM is defined as
Ct(s) ≡
∑btsc




for s ∈ [0, 1], (4.1.1)








when Y (t) ≡ t−1
∑t
i=1 Yi is the sample mean of the first t observations. Note that
Ω2Y = Var[Yi] if the process {Yi : i = 1, 2, . . .} has no autocorrelation over time.
Let {W(u) : u ∈ [0, ∞)} denote a standard Brownian motion process so that the
random variables W(s) and W(u) for arbitrary s, u ∈ [0, ∞) are jointly normal with
E[W(s)] = E[W(u)] = 0 and Cov[W(s),W(u)] = min{s, u}.
For each positive integer t, the random function Ct(·) is an element of D[0, 1],
the space of functions on [0, 1] that are right-continuous and have left-hand limits
[4]. As Kim et al. [25] do, we assume that {Yi : i = 1, 2, . . .} satisfies the following
Functional Central Limit Theorem (FCLT).
Assumption FCLT. There exist finite real constants E[Yi] and Ω
2
Y > 0 such that
the sequence of random functions {Ct(·) : t = 1, 2, . . .} converges in distribution to a








denotes convergence in distribution as t→∞.
Note that, based on the definition (4.1.1) and the assumption FCLT, the following
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approximation holds for Yi in any distribution if t is sufficiently large.
t∑
i=1








= E[Yi]t+ ΩYW(t) (4.1.2)
where
D
≈ denotes approximate equality in distribution and D= denotes exact equality
in distribution.
As we saw in Chapter 3, both of the JMCUSUM and SMCUSUM charts are based









`c,ri , t = 1, 2, . . . ,
where






, i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
While the JMCUSUM chart applies a control limit directly to the monitoring statistic,
the SMCUSUM chart applies separate control limits according to different scan radius
options.
Note that Sc,rt itself is an MCUSUM statistic that can be calculated recursively
by




t ), t = 1, 2, . . . ,
where Sc,r0 = 0 for all c ∈ P and r ∈ R. Then it is easy to see that S
c,r
t is always






Though both of the JMCUSUM and SMCUSUM charts perform well, the SMCUSUM
chart has an advantage. While searching for the appropriate control limit that yields
the target ARL0, the JMCUSUM chart uses tedious trial-and-error simulation that
requires intensive modeling of the underlying process. The SMCUSUM chart uses an
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analytical approximation method that is much faster in terms of calculating its control
limit than trial-and-error simulation. In spite of the advantage, we still present some
motivations for developing a new MCUSUM chart for practical use.
First, Chapter 3 showed that the performance of the SMCUSUM chart highly




mends use of a reference value k ≤ 2. With this condition on the reference value, the
range of the scan radius is restricted, and this restricted range may cause inconve-
nience for users, especially when the monitoring area is large. In addition, since the
performance of the SMCUSUM chart deteriorates as the reference value increases,
that control limit approximation method becomes less reliable when the reference
value gets closer to 2. For example, when the number of regions p = 7× 7, the shift
magnitude δ = 1, the scan radius r = 2, and no spatial correlation exists among the
regions, the reference value of the SMCUSUM chart is approximately 1.8. With the
reference value close to 2, the empirical ARL0 of the SMCUSUM chart stays around
80% of the target ARL0, 370.
Second, the control limit approximation method for the SMCUSUM chart is based
on the independence assumption on the underlying MCUSUM statistics, Sc,rt . How-
ever, the assumption is not valid if there is positive spatial correlation among the
data or if there are overlapped regions among the spatial clusters.
Finally, both of the JMCUSUM and SMCUSUM charts are developed and tested
under the assumption that the regional disease counts data follow a multivariate
normal distribution. Unfortunately, the underlying distribution of incident data is
often unknown or modeled by a Poisson distribution, and the performance of the
charts originally developed for normal data may deteriorate when applied to non-
normal data. For example, when we apply the JMCUSUM chart to multivariate
Poisson data having all marginal means equal to 5 with the number of regions p =
7 × 7, the shift magnitude δ = 1, the scan radius r = 0, and the spatial correlation
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parameter ρ = 0.4, the empirical ARL0 drops to 44.61, which is far from the target
ARL0 = 100.
In Section 4.2, we introduce our RMCUSUM chart with a control limit search
method that can handle the correlations among the MCUSUM charts without inten-
sive modeling of the underlying process, while achieving robustness to any scan radius
range, spatial correlation, and data distribution.
4.2. RMCUSUM Charts










c,r) , t = 1, 2, . . . .








for ` = 1, 2, . . . , t. An alarm is signaled as
soon as G∗∗t ≥ g∗∗, where g∗∗ is an approximated control limit that determines the
operating characteristics of the monitoring chart. When a signal is raised for the first
time, we record (i) the current time t as the time when the control chart detects the
shift and (ii) ν∗ as the estimated change time, though the true change time ν is still
unknown.
Similar to Sc,rt , the quantity G
c,r
t is itself an MCUSUM statistic that can be cal-
culated by










` − kσc,r) and G
c,r
0 = 0 for all c ∈ P and r ∈ R. Therefore,
one MCUSUM statistic Gc,rt is recorded for each spatial cluster, and the maximum of
all pu of the MCUSUM statistics is used as the monitoring statistic G∗∗t .
It is notable that our monitoring statistic G∗∗t becomes S
∗∗




−1µc,r. Chapter 3 suggested an analytical control limit approximation
63
method for S∗∗t that can be applicable while k ≤ 2. Though that approximation
method is very fast and convenient for calculating the control limit, the possible
range of the scan radius r is restricted due to the constraint on k. In order to avoid
such a restriction on r, we use a constant k that does not depend on r as in a classical
CUSUM chart.
For the RMCUSUM chart, it is desirable that (i) g∗∗ should deliver the exact target
ARL0; and (ii) the search for such g
∗∗ should not require cumbersome modeling of
the underlying process, which can be challenging with large r. In the next two
subsections, we present our RMCUSUM chart, which incorporates a new control
limit search method that achieves these two goals when the scan radius r is fixed or
variable.
4.2.1 RMCUSUM Chart for the Fixed Scan Radius
We first consider the RMCUSUM chart for the fixed scan radius, namely,
RMCUSUM-F. If the actual outbreak radius rout is known or can be approximated
well, r can be fixed to rout for good ARL1 performance of the chart. When r is fixed,
our monitoring statistic becomes
G∗∗t = max
c
Gc,rt , t = 1, 2, . . . .
This means that the number of possible spatial clusters Oc,r is reduced to p, and one
MCUSUM statistic, Gc,rt , is monitored for each spatial cluster. An alarm is raised
when any of the p MCUSUM statistics exceed a common control limit g∗∗. If an
alarm is incurred by Gc,rt , then c is considered to be the center of the outbreak.
Due to the overlapped regions among the Oc,rs for c ∈ P and the spatial correlation
existing in the regional data xt, it is typically true that the G
c,r
t s for c ∈ P are
correlated and that the correlation among the Gc,rt s makes the search for proper
control limits difficult — as one can observe from the performance deterioration of the
SMCUSUM chart in Chapter 3. We propose a method that deals with the correlation
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S1(t)−min{S1(i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , t}
S2(t)−min{S2(i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , t}
...
Sp(t)−min{Sp(i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , t}

We define α(`) as the p × 1 vector
(




and Γ as the p × p variance-
covariance matrix of α(`). Since αc,r` s for all c ∈ P are linear combinations of the
data x`, Γ can be derived analytically from the known Σ. When Γ is a positive-
definite matrix, there exists Γ
1

















where K denotes a p × 1 vector (kσ1,r, . . . , kσp,r)′, W (t) denotes a p × 1 vector
(W1(t), . . . , Wp(t))′ with independent standard Brownian motion process compo-
nents (see Appendix C for the detailed derivation). Note that Equation (4.2.2) is
the multivariate version of Equation (4.1.2). By Equation (4.1.2), the values ofWc(t)
for c ∈ P and integer values of t can be generated by the summation of t i.i.d. standard
normal observations.
We search by trial-and-error for g∗∗ yielding the target ARL0. Figure 17 pro-
vides the detailed procedure of the RMCUSUM-F chart, including the trial-and-error
simulation search for its control limit. In Figure 17, Phase I depicts the steps for
finding the control limit value g∗∗, while Phase II shows the step for running the
RMCUSUM-F chart with the resulting g∗∗. Though g∗∗ is determined by trial-and-
error, the search does not require any complicated modeling to generate correlated
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Phase I. Searching for the control limit.
Step 1. Select a value of g∗∗ and determine the number of replications τ .
Step 2. Set t = 1, S(0) = 0, W (0) = 0, and the iteration counter i = 0.
Step 3. Generate Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , Zp]
′ where the Zcs are i.i.d. standard nor-
mal random variables for all c ∈ P .
Step 4. Set W (t) = W (t− 1) +Z and S(t) = −Kt+ Γ 12W (t).
Step 5. For c ∈ P , set
Gc,rt = Sc(t)−min{Sc(i) : i = 1, . . . , t}
= max
(






2Z]c denotes the cth element of Γ
1
2Z.
Step 6. If G∗∗t ≥ g∗∗, raise an alarm, record t as a run length, and set i = i+1.
Step 7. If i = τ , go to Step 8. Otherwise, set t = t+ 1 and go to Step 3.
Step 8. Calculate ARL0. If it is close to the target ARL0, go to Phase II.
Otherwise, pick a different value for g∗∗ and go to Step 2.
Phase II. Running the RMCUSUMf chart with the control limit.
Step 1. For each t = 1, 2, . . ., obtain xt and calculate G
∗∗
t . Raise an out-of-
control alarm if G∗∗t ≥ g∗∗.
Remark: To select a value of g∗∗ efficiently in Phase I, one may use a bisection
method or other metaheuristics instead of trying arbitrary values.
Figure 17: The RMCUSUMf chart
variables — we only need to generate p i.i.d. standard normal variables.
4.2.2 RMCUSUM Chart for the Variable Scan Radius
If rout is unknown, the use of a variable r is recommended. In this case, G
∗∗
t becomes
equivalent to the maximum of pu statistics, and an alarm is raised as soon as any of
the pu MCUSUM statistics hits a common control limit g∗∗.
In order to find g∗∗ for the pu correlated MCUSUM charts, we can consider a chart
similar to the RMCUSUM-F by expanding the dimension from p to pu. However, with
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the expanded dimension pu, Γ is often not positive–definite, which implies Γ
1
2 does not
exist. Therefore, instead of using the simple expansion of the RMCUSUM-F chart,
we introduce an alternative chart RMCUSUM-V, which is similar to the SMCUSUM
chart.
Before discussing the RMCUSUM-V chart, we need to define two types of correla-
tion related to the overlapped regions of spatial clusters for the pu MCUSUM charts.
One is the correlation among the charts with the same radius (SR-type correlation).
The other is the correlation among the charts with different radii (DR-type correla-
tion). For example, G1,r2t and G
2,r2






Since the correlation among the αc,rt s directly affects the correlation among the




Ψr1,r1 Ψr1,r2 . . . Ψr1,ru−1 Ψr1,ru






Ψru,r1 Ψru,r2 . . . Ψru,ru−1 Ψru,ru

where the (i,j)th element of a p× p matrix Ψra,rb is the correlation between α
i,ra
t and
αj,rbt for i, j ∈ P and ra, rb ∈ R. Note that Ψra,rb with ra = rb is related to the
SR-type correlation and Ψra,rb with ra 6= rb is related to the DR-type correlation.
Recall that the SMCUSUM chart applies different control limits to the MCUSUM
charts with different r (while the JMCUSUM chart applies one common control limit
to all MCUSUM charts). We employ a similar idea here, so that our monitoring
statistics for the RMCUSUM-V chart become
G∗rt ≡ max
c
Gc,rt , t = 1, 2, . . . ,
for r ∈ R; and an alarm is raised at t if any G∗rt hits the corresponding control limit,
g∗r.
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Our goal in this section is to develop the RMCUSUM-V chart that can accommo-
date both the SR-type and DR-type correlations. Note that the monitoring statistic
G∗rt is the maximum of p MCUSUM statistics with the same radius, and thus the
SR-type correlation can be dealt with simply by searching for the control limit g∗r
via Phase I of the RMCUSUM-F chart in Figure 17. For this reason, we mainly
discuss how to handle the DR-type correlation among the G∗rt s.
If there is no DR-type correlation among the u G∗rt s, finding g
∗r that yields uARL0
for each r ∈ R can be good enough to achieve the target ARL0 of the RMCUSUM-V
chart. However, as we saw in similar cases for the SMCUSUM chart (See Pages 40
and 49 in Chapter 3), the chart using the control limits with uARL0 may not perform
well for the cases where the DR-type correlation actually exists.
For the RMCUSUM-V chart, we adjust u to a corrected value ǔ by considering the
impact of the DR-type correlation, so that the control limits yielding ǔARL0 for each
G∗rt can truly achieve the RMCUSUM-V chart’s target ARL0. Figure 18 formalizes
the procedure for the RMCUSUM-V chart. Note that the RMCUSUM-F chart is a
spatial case of the RMCUSUM-V chart with ǔ = 1 and no DR-type correlation.
A remaining question for the RMCUSUMv chart is, of course, how to find ǔ
values. In order to find ǔ, we first introduce a measure of the DR-type correlation
Phase I. Searching for the control limits.
Step 1. Find ǔ (See Figure 21 later).
Step 2. For each G∗rt and r ∈ R, find g∗r that yields ǔARL0 by running Phase
I of the RMCUSUMf chart.
Phase II. Running the RMCUSUMv chart with the control limits.
Step 1. For each t = 1, 2, . . ., obtain xt and calculate G
∗r
t for r ∈ R. Raise
an out-of-control alarm if any G∗rt ≥ g∗r.
Figure 18: The RMCUSUMv chart
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and a measure of the impact of the DR-type correlation. Then we present a method
to estimate ǔ by using the relationship between the two measures.
Measure of the DR-type correlation : Recall that Ψra,rb with ra = rb is
related to the SR-type correlation and Ψra,rb with ra 6= rb is related to the DR-type
correlation. Hence, the average value of all components in Ψra,rb with ra 6= rb can
be used a measure of the DR-type correlation. For given p, k, and target ARL0, let
DRCρ denote the average value for a common spatial correlation parameter ρ. Then
we use Dρ = DRCρ/DRC0 as a standardized measure of the DR-type correlation for
that particular ρ.
Measure of the impact of the DR-type correlation : First, let us assume
the u G∗rt s are independent, and suppose we find g
∗rs that yield uARL0 for the respec-
tive G∗rt s by running Phase I of the RMCUSUM-F chart. If we run the RMCUSUM-V
chart with the g∗rs under the in-control state, we can obtain empirical ARL0 esti-
mates. Obviously, if the DR-type correlation exists among the G∗rt s, the empirical
ARL0 will likely be different than the target ARL0 of the RMCUSUM-V chart. Let




). Then Aρ can be used as a measure of the DR-type correlation’s
impact on the ARL0.
We set our correction term ǔ = u
Aρ
= u· Target ARL0
Empirical ARL0
. This means that we set ǔ < u
if the empirical ARL0 is larger than the target ARL0 and ǔ > u if the empirical ARL0
is smaller than the target. Our method for setting ǔ is based on an empirical guess,
but we will confirm that the ǔ performs well under various experimental configurations
in Section 4.3.
Since obtaining Aρ for the numerous ρ-values under consideration requires a great
deal of simulation time and effort, we present a more-convenient method to estimate
Aρ (and thus ǔ) by studying the relationship between Dρ and Aρ.
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Relationship between Dρ and Aρ: We plot Aρ as a function of Dρ and em-
pirically find a linear relationship between them. More specifically, under each con-
figuration in Table 17, Figure 19 depicts the relationship between Dρ and Aρ for Σ2
with ρ = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.7, where Σ2 is the same correlation structure defined
in Chapter 3. Under the correlation structure Σ2, Dρ is largest (i.e., 1) when ρ = 0
and becomes smaller as ρ > 0 gets larger. Similarly, Aρ is largest when ρ = 0 (i.e.,
Dρ = 1) and becomes smaller as ρ > 0 gets larger (i.e., Dρ gets smaller). In Figure
Table 17: Configurations
Configuration p k R Target ARL0
1 7× 7 0.5 {0, 1,
√
2, 2} 100
2 7× 7 0.5 {1,
√
2} 100
3 7× 7 0.5 {
√
2, 2} 100
4 7× 7 0.1 {
√
2, 2} 100
5 7× 7 0.5 {
√
2, 2} 370






















Figure 19: Dρ vs Aρ
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19, Aρ increases linearly as Dρ increases for the all configurations.
Estimation of Aρ and ǔ: Assuming that the linear relationship between Dρ
and Aρ holds for all configurations, we can estimate Aρ for various ρ by interpolation.
For example, suppose that we first run the RMCUSUM-V chart with ρ1 and ρ2 and
obtain Dρ1 , Dρ2 , Aρ1 , and Aρ2 . After drawing a line between the two points (Dρ1 ,
Aρ1) and (Dρ2 , Aρ2) as depicted in Figure 20, we can estimate Aρ for any ρ1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2




(Dρ −Dρ2) + Aρ2 , (4.2.3)
where Dρ is the value calculated analytically without the trial-and-error simulation.
Since ǔ can be estimated by u/Aρ, we can reduce the computational burden when
testing various ρ for the RMCUSUM-V chart.










Figure 20: Estimation of Aρ
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Step 1. Determine ρ1 and ρ2. Calculate Dρ1 and Dρ2 .
Step 2. Obtain Aρ1 and Aρ2 .
Step 2.1 For each r ∈ R and ρ1, find the g∗r that yields uARL0 by running
Phase I of the RMCUSUM-F chart.
Step 2.2 With the g∗rs in hand, run the RMCUSUM-V chart and obtain the
empirical ARL0.




Step 2.4 Repeat Steps 2.1–2.3 for ρ2 to calculate Aρ2 .
Step 3. For a given ρ to test, estimate Aρ by Equation (4.2.3).
Step 4. Set ǔ = u/Aρ.
Figure 21: Finding ǔ
4.3. Experiments
In this section, we test the accuracy of the RMCUSUM charts as well as the robust-
ness of the charts to the underlying distribution of regional data and the correlation
structure.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
For archetypal examples, we consider 7× 7 and 20× 20 regions for p when the target
ARL0 is set to 100 and 370. For the out-of-control state, we assume a homogeneous
shift magnitude with δ = 1.
Outbreak cluster : Outbreak clusters with various rout values are tested when
the outbreak center cout is located at the center of the 7 × 7 or 20 × 20 grid of the
regional system. For example, Figure 22 illustrates outbreak regions in the 7 × 7
regional system, colored in gray with cout = 25 and rout = 0, 1, 2.
Spatial correlation : We mainly consider two different correlation structures
for xt. The first correlation structure Σ1 denotes the p × p correlation matrix given
in Jian et al. [24], where any pair of adjacent regions has a correlation coefficient
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rout = 0          rout = 1         rout = 2 
Figure 22: Outbreak clusters when cout = 25 (outbreak regions are in gray)
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, any two cross-adjacent regions have correlation coefficient ρ/2, and
any other pairs of regions have no correlation. The second correlation structure Σ2
denotes the p×p correlation matrix given in Chapter 3, where any pair of regions has a
correlation coefficient that depends on the distance between the regions. Specifically,
the (i, j)th element of Σ2 is ρ
dist(qi,qj) for i, j ∈ P . Under the 7 × 7 regional system,
Figure 23 compares the different correlation settings of Σ1 and Σ2 for region 25, which
corresponds to the 25th rows of Σ1 and Σ2, respectively. We test the spatial correlation
parameter ρ = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.7 for our examples. However, the eigenvalues of Σ1
approach zero or become negative when ρ ≥ 0.5, which results in an ill-conditioned
Σ1. Thus, we restrict ρ < 0.5 for Σ1.
Marginal distribution : We test two different underlying distributions for the
raw data yt. One is the multivariate normal distribution with mean vector µ, and the
other is the multivariate Poisson distribution with the mean vector whose components
are all 5. The reference value k is set to 0.5 for the normal data as is usually used
for a classical CUSUM chart, and k is set to 0.1 for the Poisson data as in Kim et
al. [25].
Note that a cluster near the edge of the study area can contain a relatively smaller
number of regions. In order to keep the number of regions in each cluster the same,
we have added dummy regions. For example, we actually generate 9 × 9 regions to
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 23: Correlation settings of Σ1 and Σ2 for region 25
monitor 7×7 regions with r = 2. We conduct 10,000 replications of each experiment to
calibrate empirical control limits (i.e., τ = 10,000), and 3,000 replications to obtain
empirical ARLs (either ARL0 or ARL1). In order to interpolate the lines for the
RMCUSUM-V chart, we use ρ1 = 0.00 and ρ2 = 0.49 for Σ1, and ρ1 = 0.00 and
ρ2 = 0.99 for Σ2.
4.3.2 Accuracy of Control Limits
The RMCUSUM charts are designed to be distribution-free. In order to test the
accuracy of the control limits of the RMCUSUM charts, we apply the charts with
the data following the multivariate normal distribution and the multivariate Poisson
distribution under the Σ2 spatial correlation structure.
Range of the scan radius: Table 18 exhibits the empirical ARL0s of the
RMCUSUM charts under various experimental configurations with the multivariate
normal data. Note that the ARL0 values are from the RMCUSUM-F charts when the
cardinality of R is 1, while the ARL0 values are from the RMCUSUM-V charts when
the cardinality of R is greater than 1. In Table 18, all empirical ARL0s are −3% to
8% off from the target ARL0s for all configurations tested. Unlike the SMCUSUM
chart, the RMCUSUM chart does not have any restriction on the range of the scan
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Table 18: Empirical ARL0 from the multivariate normal data
p R Target ARL0 ρ Empirical ARL0
7× 7 {1} 100 0.0 100.65
7× 7 {1} 100 0.4 100.52
7× 7 {1,
√
2} 100 0.2 104.89
7× 7 {1,
√
2} 100 0.7 101.46
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.4 97.54
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.7 104.10
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 370 0.0 371.74
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 370 0.2 393.53
7× 7 {0, 1,
√
2, 2} 100 0.0 102.68
7× 7 {0, 1,
√
2, 2} 100 0.4 104.16
20× 20 {5} 100 0.0 100.59
20× 20 {5} 100 0.4 100.44
20× 20 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.2 99.58
20× 20 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.7 107.85
20× 20 {
√
20, 5} 100 0.4 101.36
20× 20 {
√
20, 5} 370 0.0 371.19
radius. For example, the RMCUSUM chart performs well under the configurations
p = 20× 20 and R = {5} or {
√
20, 5} while the SMCUSUM chart is not able to test
those configurations due to the restrictions on its reference value and the range of the
scan radius. In addition, the empirical ARL0 of the SMCUSUM chart decreases as ρ
increases because of its assumption on the independence of the MCUSUM statistics.
We do not observe such performance deterioration with the RMCUSUM chart. Note
that the RMCUSUM-F chart does not require the ǔ estimation procedure and thus
can result in less simulation/interpolation error when compared to the RMCUSUM-V
chart. This fact is confirmed by the empirical ARL0s of the fixed radius cases (within
±1% from the target) in Table 18.
Non-normality : We experiment with multivariate Poisson data in order to
test the robustness to non-normality. Table 19 presents the empirical ARL0s of the
RMCUSUM charts arising from the multivariate Poisson data. The reference value
k is set to 0.1, which is employed for analogous Poisson experimentation in Kim et
al. [25]. Under all configurations tested, the RMCUSUM chart always gives results
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Table 19: Empirical ARL0 from the multivariate Poisson data
p R Target ARL0 ρ Empirical ARL0
7× 7 {1} 100 0.0 95.04
7× 7 {1} 100 0.4 95.73
7× 7 {1,
√
2} 100 0.2 96.29
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.0 97.53
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.4 98.96
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 370 0.0 354.83
7× 7 {
√
2, 2} 370 0.2 352.68
7× 7 {0, 1,
√
2, 2} 100 0.0 94.51
7× 7 {0, 1,
√
2, 2} 100 0.4 95.67
20× 20 {5} 100 0.2 94.26
20× 20 {
√
2, 2} 100 0.4 96.12
20× 20 {
√

































Figure 24: Σ3 and Σ4
within −6% of the target ARL0s.
Spatial correlation structure : In order to study the robustness to the spatial
correlation structure, we test the RMCUSUM charts under the two additional spatial
correlation structures, Σ3 and Σ4. The additional correlation structures depend on
the distance between the regions. Specifically, the (i, j)th element of Σ3 is 0.5
dist(qi,qj)
for i, j ∈ P while the (i, j)th element of Σ4 is 0.3 − 0.1(dist(qi, qj) − 1). Figure 24
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compares Σ3 and Σ4 to Σ2 with ρ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.7. When applied to the configuration
p = 7 × 7, R = {
√
2, 2}, target ARL0 = 100, and multivariate normal data, the
RMCUSUM charts for Σ3 and Σ4 provide the empirical ARL0s 105.62 and 104.87
respectively.
In all of the configurations we tested, the RMCUSUM chart finds its control limits
that deliver ARL0s close to the target.
4.3.3 ARL1 Performance
ARL1s are often used as a performance measure for timely detection of outbreaks. In
addition to satisfying the pre-specified target ARL0, it is also desirable for CUSUM
charts to achieve low ARL1s.
In Tables 20 and 21, we display the ARL1 performance of the RMCUSUM charts
under Σ2 when the control limits are searched to yield the target ARL0 = 100.
Table 20 reports the ARL1s arising from multivariate normal data, while Table 21
reports the ARL1s from multivariate Poisson data. In both Tables 20 and 21, the
RMCUSUM charts provide lower ARL1s as the actual outbreak radius rout gets larger.
Further, when the chart’s scan radius exactly matches the actual outbreak radius (i.e.,
rout = r = 1), the RMCUSUM chart with the fixed scan radius R = {1} performs
better than the chart with variable scan radius R = {0, 1,
√
2, 2}.
All of the ARL1s in Table 21 are larger than the corresponding entries in Table
20, which implies that the RMCUSUM charts take more time to detect outbreaks
Table 20: ARL1 from multivariate normal data












Table 21: ARL1 from multivariate Poisson data











Table 22: ARL1 comparison
RMCUSUM ARL1 (JMCUSUM ARL1)





0 41.86 (36.94) 61.59 (62.02) 66.04 (72.16) 44.61 (41.17)
1 19.00 (21.39) 10.56 (10.41) 13.98 (16.49) 11.59 (10.93)
2 12.67 (16.58) 7.02 (6.69) 5.25 (4.43) 6.10 (4.93)
0.2
0 37.37 (33.69) 63.92 (64.77) 71.15 (74.20) 42.33 (37.89)
1 26.63 (26.39) 12.53 (12.54) 20.30 (23.81) 14.45 (13.78)
2 20.23 (22.77) 10.95 (10.86) 6.99 (6.42) 8.22 (7.18)
0.4
0 20.88 (21.28) 43.58 (47.86) 55.42 (66.20) 23.72 (24.22)
1 16.39 (17.54) 9.30 (9.02) 15.57 (18.66) 10.96 (10.39)
2 15.09 (16.66) 10.20 (10.00) 6.32 (5.63) 7.52 (6.41)
1.0
0.0
0 13.17 (13.08) 26.63 (47.75) 36.40 (66.68) 14.67 (14.60)
1 7.46 (7.46) 4.32 (3.36) 5.72 (7.57) 4.91 (3.66)
2 5.93 (5.95) 3.39 (2.24) 2.50 (1.45) 2.91 (1.67)
0.2
0 11.54 (11.66) 27.16 (44.04) 37.92 (67.81) 13.34 (13.40)
1 9.54 (9.56) 4.94 (4.08) 7.89 (11.15) 5.76 (4.60)
2 8.40 (8.24) 4.93 (3.74) 3.16 (2.11) 3.69 (2.42)
0.4
0 7.17 (6.91) 15.06 (28.31) 22.05 (54.09) 8.35 (8.03)
1 6.53 (6.13) 3.91 (2.92) 6.32 (7.92) 4.58 (3.39)
2 6.51 (5.95) 4.63 (3.40) 2.89 (1.84) 3.39 (2.20)
in the case of multivariate Poisson data than with multivariate normal data. This
is because the multivariate Poisson distribution we test is asymmetric and generates
negative values for the standardized xt more frequently than does the multivariate
normal distribution; and the reference value k we use for the multivariate Poisson
data is different than the k for the multivariate normal data.
Table 22 compares the ARL1s of the RMCUSUM chart to the ARL1s of the
JMCUSUM chart under Σ2. For all configurations in Table 22, the target ARL0
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is set to 100. The RMCUSUM charts provide significantly lower ARL1s than the
JMCUSUM charts for the fixed radius cases r > rout. With the variable radius,
the JMCUSUM charts produce slightly lower ARL1s than the RMCUSUM charts.
Overall, ARL1 performances of the RMCUSUM and JMCUSUM charts are similar.
4.4. Conclusions
Motivated by the JMCUSUM and SMCUSUM charts, we wish to develop a new
method that can search for the control limits of correlated MCUSUM charts. The
new method is named the RMCUSUM chart, and is designed to be distribution-free
for the underlying data, restriction-free for the range of scan radius, and robust to
spatial correlation structures.
The RMCUSUM chart determines its control limits via simple simulation and
interpolation. Our search method requires the variance-covariance matrix of the data
and the generation of independent standard normal observations, but does not require
modeling of the underlying process.
Control limits for the RMCUSUM charts are accurately determined under various
problem configurations. We test the RMCUSUM charts with four different spatial
correlation structures and two underlying distributions of data that have been con-
sidered in the biosurveillance literature. We find a linear relationship between the
suggested measure of DR-type correlation and its impact on empirical ARL0s, and we
develop a technique to reduce the computational burden for testing the RMCUSUM
charts.
While maintaining satisfactory accuracy of the control limits, the RMCUSUM
charts produce comparable ARL1s to those from the JMCUSUM charts; but the





The epidemic simulation model discussed in this thesis reports valid estimates of
illness attack rates and economic costs associated with different combinations of mit-
igation strategies. Our research show that delays in vaccination can greatly reduce
the effectiveness of the vaccination strategy, and that reactive combination strate-
gies including practical school closure can substantially reduce total costs associated
with influenza morbidity and mortality. We also provide the information needed for
users to build a simulation model for disease propagation, to use the model to better
understand diseases, and to identify appropriate intervention strategies.
In order to decide when and where to apply the mitigation strategies, the detection
of an outbreak should be accomplished at an early time. In terms of statistical
approaches for outbreak detection in the presence of spatial correlation, we develop
spatiotemporal monitoring statistics for two MCUSUM charts, named SMCUSUM
and RMCUSUM.
From the SMCUSUM chart, we study how the outbreak coverage and spatial
correlation impact the charts’s performance, and find that higher spatial correlation
does not always yield faster detection but often facilitates accurate identification of
outbreaks. When assuming the independence among the MCUSUM statistics and
confining the scan radius to a certain range, we approximate the control limits ana-
lytically so that we can completely avoid the computational burden for trial-and-error
simulations to find the control limit. The approximation method is effective especially
when the number of monitoring regions is large.
When severe correlations exist among the MCUSUM statistics or when the scan
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radius should not be restricted, one can use the RMCUSUM chart. A critical strength
of the control limit approximation method for the RMCUSUM chart is that we can
use such a chart even when the data distribution is unknown — without modeling of
the complicated underlying process. Based on our experimental results, we believe
that the RMCUSUM chart is robust enough to handle a variety of data distributions
and spatial correlation structures.
By using the epidemic simulation model and the MCUSUM charts suggested in
this thesis, we expect to help public health authorities, practitioners, researchers, and




Table 23: Average age-stratified overall illness attack rates (%) and cost estimates











No Intervention 29.5 55.9 40.8 14.3 11 34.1 81.1
Vaccination Only, Low Efficacy, 35% Coverage
Pre-vaccination 21.2 47.9 30.2 9.5 7.3 26.1 71.1
Reactive Vaccination2:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 24 51 33.8 11 8.5 28.8 77.7
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 24.6 51.6 34.6 11.4 8.8 29.5 79.3
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 27.4 54.2 38.3 13.1 10.1 32.2 86
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 24 51 33.8 11 8.4 28.8 77.7
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 24.2 51.3 34 11.1 8.5 29 78.1
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 25.6 52.6 36.3 12.2 9.3 30.7 82.2
Vaccination Only, Low Efficacy, 70% Coverage
Pre-vaccination 8.8 25.3 13.1 3.6 2.8 12 47
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 17.8 43.2 25.4 7.7 5.9 22.4 71.6
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 19.2 45.1 27.7 8.6 6.6 24.1 75.7
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 25.4 52.2 36 12.1 9.3 30.4 89.4
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 17.4 42.9 25.1 7.6 5.8 22.2 71.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 18.1 43.5 25.8 7.9 6 22.7 72.4
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 22 48.2 31.8 10.3 7.8 27.1 83
Vaccination Only, Moderate Efficacy, 35% Coverage
Pre-vaccination 14.4 37.5 21.1 6.3 4.7 18.8 53.7
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 18 43.4 26 8 6.1 22.8 63.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 19.6 45.5 28.4 8.9 6.8 24.6 67.5
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 25.7 52.5 36.5 12.3 9.4 30.8 82.5
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 18 43.2 25.8 7.9 6 22.6 62.8
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 18.3 43.7 26.4 8.1 6.2 23 63.7
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 22.2 48.3 32.1 10.3 8 27.3 74.1
Vaccination Only, Moderate Efficacy, 70% Coverage
Pre-vaccination 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.04 0.03 0.2 19.3
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 3.3 10.1 5 1.3 1 4.6 29.7
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 9.7 26.8 15 4.3 3.3 13.3 50.2
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 22.3 48.3 32.6 10.6 8.1 27.6 83
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 1.5 4.7 2.3 0.6 0.5 2.2 25.6
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 5.7 17.1 8.9 2.4 1.9 8.1 39.5
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 17.5 40.5 26.7 8.3 6.3 22.6 74
Antivirals (10% Cov.) Only 26 53 37.3 12.7 9.6 31.3 75.9
SC/SD, Only 22.5 43.6 27.7 8.6 6.7 24 125
Antivirals (10% Cov.)+SC/SD 7.1 18.8 10.2 2.8 2.2 9.2 48
1 We use the abbreviation SC/SD for School closure/Social distancing intervention.
2 In reactive vaccination scenarios, two types of supply-chain delays that can affect vaccination programs are
considered: an initial delay (initial dly) in program implementation of 0, 30, or 60 days; and additional delays
(addl dly) after initiation of the program, such that vaccine doses become available in three equal batches, two
weeks apart (rather than in one batch).
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Table 23 (Continued)











Vaccination (Low Efficacy, 35% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage)
Pre-vaccination 14 37.8 22 6.5 5 19.3 56.4
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 19.6 46.9 29.3 9.2 7 25.3 70.8
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 20.1 47.4 29.9 9.4 7.1 25.7 71.8
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 21.4 48.8 31.6 10.1 7.7 27.1 75
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 19.5 46.7 29.2 9.1 6.9 25.2 70.6
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 19.7 47 29.5 9.2 7 25.4 71.1
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 20.6 47.9 30.5 9.6 7.3 26.2 72.9
Vaccination (Low Efficacy, 70% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage)
Pre-vaccination 2 7.3 3.6 0.9 0.7 3.3 28.3
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 12.6 35.9 19.8 5.7 4.4 17.7 62
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 13.1 37.2 20.7 6 4.6 18.4 63.9
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 16.5 42.3 25.2 7.6 5.8 22 72.4
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 12.2 34.9 19.4 5.6 4.2 17.3 61.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 12.6 36.2 20 5.8 4.4 17.9 62.5
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 14.6 39.6 22.5 6.6 5.1 19.9 67.4
Vaccination (Moderate Efficacy, 35% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage)
Pre-vaccination 1.2 4.8 2.3 0.6 0.5 2.1 16.1
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 6.2 21.1 11.1 3 2.3 10 34.3
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 10.9 32.2 17.8 5.1 3.9 15.8 48.2
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 15.4 40.4 23.8 7.1 5.4 20.8 60.1
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 4.8 17.4 9 2.4 1.8 8.1 30.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 8.2 25.9 13.9 3.9 2.9 12.4 40.2
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 13.3 36.9 21 6.1 4.7 18.6 54.7
Vaccination (Moderate Efficacy, 70% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage)
Pre-vaccination 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 20.7
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 0.7 2.7 1.2 0.3 0.2 1.2 23.3
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 2.6 1.6 4.8 1.3 1 4.4 30.9
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 8 25 13.7 3.8 2.9 12.2 49.1
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.6 22
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 1.4 5.4 2.6 0.7 0.5 2.4 26.2
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 3.9 14 7.4 2 1.5 6.6 36.1
Vaccination (Low Efficacy, 35% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 10.9 26.3 13.9 3.9 3.1 12.7 69.9
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 15.5 34.7 19.6 5.7 4.5 17.5 95.7
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 16.3 35.9 20.4 6 4.7 18.3 99
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 17.5 37.7 22.1 6.6 5.1 19.6 108.8
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 15.3 34.3 19.3 5.6 4.4 17.3 93.6
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 15.8 35.2 19.9 5.8 4.5 17.8 96.5
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 16.7 36.3 20.9 6.2 4.8 18.6 101.9
Vaccination (Low Efficacy, 70% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.7 22
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 6.1 16 8.1 2.2 1.7 7.5 53.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 9.2 23.3 12 3.3 2.6 11 70.6
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 13.3 30.7 17.1 4.9 3.9 15.4 96.6
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 4.8 12.7 6.3 1.7 1.3 5.9 46
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 7.9 10.3 10.3 2.8 2.2 9.5 63
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 11.3 27.3 14.6 4.1 3.2 13.3 82.6
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Vaccination (Moderate Efficacy, 35% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 1.8 5 2.4 0.6 0.5 2.3 19.6
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 7.1 18 9.3 2.5 2 8.5 49.4
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 13.5 30.7 17.1 4.9 3.9 15.4 87.3
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 15.8 35.5 19.9 5.8 4.5 17.9 95.7
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 5.6 14.4 7.4 2 1.6 6.8 41.6
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 8.4 10.8 10.8 3 2.3 9.9 56.3
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 11.6 27.3 14.8 4.2 3.3 13.4 74.7
Vaccination (Moderate Efficacy, 70% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 0.03 0.1 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 19.1
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.7 22
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 2.6 7 3.5 0.9 0.7 3.2 34.7
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 8.4 19.9 10.9 3 2.4 9.8 69.1
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 0.15 0.48 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.19 19.7
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 1.21 3.29 1.58 0.42 0.32 1.49 25.9
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 5.19 13.11 7.01 1.88 1.48 6.35 51.2
Vaccination (Low Efficacy, 35% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 0.7 2.4 1.1 0.3 0.2 1 15.9
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 3.1 9.8 4.8 1.3 1 4.5 32.2
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 3.3 10.7 5.4 1.4 1.1 4.9 34.2
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 3.6 11.7 5.6 1.5 1.2 5.4 36.8
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 2.6 8.4 4.2 1.1 0.8 3.9 29.2
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 3.1 10 5 1.3 1 4.6 32.6
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 3.2 10.4 5.2 1.4 1.1 4.8 33.8
Vaccination (Low Efficacy, 70% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.2 21.3
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 1.8 5.9 2.7 0.7 0.6 2.6 32
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 2.3 7.1 3.4 0.9 0.7 3.2 35.2
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 3.2 10 4.9 1.3 1 4.6 41.7
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 1.2 3.9 1.9 0.5 0.4 1.8 28.4
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 2 6.4 3.1 0.8 0.6 2.9 33.6
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 2.7 8.4 4.1 1.1 0.8 3.8 37.8
Vaccination (Moderate Efficacy, 35% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.2 11.9
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 0.5 1.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.8 14.9
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 1.1 3.7 1.7 0.5 0.3 1.6 18.6
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 1.5 5.3 2.5 0.6 0.5 2.4 22
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 13.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 0.8 2.8 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.2 16.6
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 1.2 4.4 2.1 0.5 0.4 2 20.2
Vaccination (Moderate Efficacy, 70% Coverage) + Antivirals (10% Coverage) + SC/SD
Pre-vaccination 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 20.6
Reactive Vaccination:
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: Yes 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 21.6
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: Yes 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.7 23.8
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: Yes 0.9 3.2 1.5 0.4 0.3 1.4 27.4
Initial Dly: None Addl Dly: No 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.03 0.02 0.1 20.1
Initial Dly: 30 Day Addl Dly: No 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 22.8
Initial Dly: 60 Day Addl Dly: No 0.8 2.7 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.2 26.1
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APPENDIX B
Additional experimental results are provided for p = 7×7, 20×20, and ARL0 = 100,
370. Based on the results from Chapter 3, we expect similar performances with Σ1
and Σ2, and thus run the additional experiments only with Σ2. For the out-of-control
state when p = 20 × 20, we have the outbreak center cout = 210 (i.e., at coordinate
qc = (11, 10)) with rout = 0, 1, 2, and assume a homogeneous shift magnitude δ = 1.
For the JMCUSUM-F chart with p = 20 × 20, we provide a series of figures
corresponding to Figures 12, 13, and 14, respectively. We only test the target values
ARL0 = 100 and 370 here; we expect that the tendency of the ratio (the empirical
ARL0 to the target ARL0) with a larger target ARL0 = 700 would not be significantly
different from the tendency observed in Section 3.3.2. Figure 25 depicts the impact of
r on the ARL approximation accuracy for a single MCUSUM chart. Figure 26 shows
how the ratio changes for a classical CUSUM chart as k increases. Figure 27 gives
the performance of the JMCUSUM-F chart. In order to keep k ≤ 2 for all ρ values
tested, we consider r ∈ {0, 1,
√
2, 2}.
The detailed experimental results are presented in Tables 24, 25, 26, and 27. For
the fixed scan radius case, empirical ARL0s of the JMCUSUM-F chart with analytical
control limits are reported for some selected scan radius options in Table 24. Table 25
compares analytical ARLJF1 s to empirical ARL
JF
1 s with analytical control limits. For
the variable scan radius case, Table 26 presents empirical ARL0s of the SMCUSUM
chart with analytical control limits, and Table 27 compares empirical ARL1s of the
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Figure 27: Empirical ARL0
Target ARL0
(%) versus r for the JMCUSUM-F chart
Table 24: Empirical ARL0 of the JMCUSUM-F chart with analytical h
∗∗
p Target ARL0 ρ r = 0 r = 1 r = 2
7× 7 370
0.0 377.42 355.96 298.78
0.2 385.42 358.85 326.63
0.4 376.32 352.58 315.08
0.7 353.37 292.37 239.32
20× 20 100
0.0 113.60 97.96 81.55
0.2 112.76 99.82 90.74
0.4 107.32 97.57 88.49
0.7 100.02 82.38 64.75
20× 20 370
0.0 383.59 358.96 288.24
0.2 386.37 356.28 325.12
0.4 371.55 349.61 323.49
0.7 360.43 302.55 233.97
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Table 25: Empirical (analytical) ARLJF1 with analytical h
∗∗
p Target ARL0 ρ r = rout = 0 r = rout = 1 r = rout = 2
7× 7 370
0.0 16.18 (16.23) 3.92 (3.89) 1.70 (1.64)
0.2 14.32 (14.32) 4.76 (4.65) 2.50 (2.43)
0.4 10.68 (10.65) 4.13 (4.07) 2.57 (2.47)
0.7 5.16 (5.08) 2.22 (2.10) 1.50 (1.39)
20× 20 100
0.0 17.57 (17.81) 4.23 (4.21) 1.82 (1.76)
0.2 15.43 (15.69) 5.04 (5.04) 2.70 (2.62)
0.4 11.51 (11.63) 4.45 (4.40) 2.74 (2.66)
0.7 5.56 (5.50) 2.37 (2.26) 1.60 (1.49)
20× 20 370
0.0 20.27 (20.42) 4.79 (4.73) 2.07 (1.97)
0.2 18.04 (17.96) 5.77 (5.68) 3.04 (2.93)
0.4 13.30 (13.25) 5.06 (4.95) 3.11 (2.97)
0.7 6.28 (6.21) 2.63 (2.52) 1.80 (1.65)
Table 26: Empirical ARL0 for the SMCUSUM chart with analytical h
∗r
















Table 27: Empirical ARLJV1 (ARL
S
1)
p Target ARL0 ρ rout = 0 rout = 1 rout = 2
7× 7 370
0.0 17.75 (17.94) 4.25 (4.29) 1.90 (1.92)
0.2 16.64 (16.67) 5.28 (5.39) 2.89 (2.85)
0.4 12.54 (12.69) 4.80 (4.87) 3.02 (2.98)
0.7 5.64 (5.70) 2.53 (2.45) 1.49 (1.68)
20× 20 100
0.0 18.37 (18.57) 4.91 (4.63) 2.03 (2.05)
0.2 16.96 (16.98) 5.65 (5.75) 3.07 (3.05)
0.4 13.05 (13.15) 5.11 (5.11) 3.20 (3.15)
0.7 6.01 (6.03) 2.65 (2.59) 1.59 (1.79)
20× 20 370
0.0 22.07 (22.07) 5.13 (5.16) 2.27 (2.28)
0.2 20.35 (20.36) 6.42 (6.47) 3.41 (3.37)
0.4 15.24 (15.31) 5.71 (5.74) 3.54 (3.50)
0.7 6.79 (6.82) 2.93 (2.87) 1.77 (1.98)
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denotes the componentwise summation of vectors.





2 )′ [47]. From the eigen decomposition, Λ is the p×p diagonal matrix whose
entries are the eigenvalues of Γ and Q is the p× p orthogonal matrix (i.e., Q′ = Q−1)
whose columns are the eigenvectors of Γ.
From the similar idea employed in Kim and Dieker [26], for V (t) ≡ Λ− 12Q′α(`),
E [V (`)] = 0
in the in-control state and
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